THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

H. M. Robinson

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.1976.tb00291.x

Analytic Phenomenology

10.1093/oso/9780190677015.003.0010 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Philip Goff

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Contemporary Philosophy ◽

Analytic Tradition ◽

Essential Nature ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

This chapter outlines a consciousness-based approach to metaphysics: analytic phenomenology. Chapter 5 argued that introspection reveals the essential nature of our conscious states. Analytic phenomenology builds on this, taking our introspective grasp of the nature of consciousness as a crucial source of data for metaphysical enquiry. This methodology is explored in relation to contemporary debates on composition, and a phenomenological argument for presentism is outlined to give an example of how analytic phenomenology might be applied outside of the mind–body problem. The datum of consciousness is hugely neglected in contemporary philosophy; proper appreciation of it has the potential to revolutionize metaphysics in the analytic tradition.

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Schelling and Peirce’s philosophy of mind

Theoria Beograd ◽

10.2298/theo1701145v ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 60 (1) ◽

pp. 145-162

Author(s):

Stanko Vlaski

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Body Problem ◽

Contemporary Philosophy ◽

Philosophy Of Nature ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

The crucial thesis of Schelling?s philosophy of nature, according to which the matter could be understood as the ?extinct mind?, Peirce understands as the only reasonable theory concerning the solution of the problem of the relation between mind and matter and considers it as the center of his synechism. American philosopher develops his synechistical standpoint within the series of articles which he wrote for the journal The Monist and defines synechism as the tendency to conceive every being as something continuous. The author interprets Peirce?s project as the part of the discussion about the mind-body problem which characterizes the so-called contemporary philosophy of mind, but by investigation of its Schellingian motives he tries to explain the comprehensive meaning of Peirce?s attempt. The last chapter of the paper aims to approach Schelling?s and Peirce?s consideration of the mind-body relation from the perspective which finds in them attempts of philosophical integration of the un-consciousness. Two idealistic strivings are implicitly demarcated with the regard to the mode of defining the place of the concept of self-consciousness.

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The Mind-Body Problem Revisited

Contemporary Psychology ◽

10.1037/0013579 ◽

1975 ◽

Vol 20 (8) ◽

pp. 660-660

Author(s):

MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽

ARNOLD SCHEIBEL

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

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Zombies and Dolls

10.1093/oso/9780198728443.003.0002 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Marcello Massimini ◽

Giulio Tononi

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Thought Experiments ◽

Turing Test ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

The Mind ◽

The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

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Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

10.1093/oso/9780198758600.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

James Van Cleve

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Necessary Truths ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

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