Le Bon’s crowd psychology and post-truth

The phenomenon of post-truth, in which truth (or facts or the best scientific evidence) is brushed aside in public debates, has recently caught the eye of many philosophers, who typically see it as a threat to deliberative democracy. In this paper, it is argued that Gustave Le Bon?s remarks on crowd psychology, which had been very popular in past (and brushed aside later on), might be relevant for a better understanding of psychological mechanisms that lead to post-truth. According to Le Bon, crowds are often irrational, whereas those who try to convince them to do something should use specific techniques of persuasion, such as affirmation, repetition, contagion and prestige, of which the last one can be undermined either by fiasco (the fastest way), or by critique (a bit slower, but nonetheless effective way). It is the age of posttruth that goes towards the neutralization of any critique (Le Bon himself considered such neutralization devastating for democratic societies), which has been, according to some authors, affected to a great extent by technological innovations in media, such as social media that some authors consider anti-social due to their negative impact on society. I argue that Le Bon?s insights might be useful to members of scientific and philosophical community in their attempts to eliminate the spreading of quasi-scientific views in public discourse.

Subjectivity does not necessarily entail arbitrariness

The thesis of the paper is that both non-moral and moral values are subjective and also objective. Non-moral values are objective because they are subjected to commensurability and have a price. They are subjective because they depend for their existence on the fact that somebody has decided to realize an end, the realization of which is a non-moral value (if the process of realization was successful); there are indefinitely many criteria of non-moral values. Moral values are objective because the criterion of moral evaluation is one and invariable. They are subjective because their existence depends on the fact of our being interested in their existence: interest in being able to be interested. That is possible only because subjectivity does not necessarily imply arbitrariness.

Hartmann′s aesthetics of the sublime in arts

The text discusses the place of the sublime in the organization of the strata of arts, the phenomenon on periphery of the sublime and phenomenon in opposition to the sublime. The result of the research is that beauty in a broader aesthetic sense is not only formally and indifferently superior to the sublime and other main aesthetic categories, but that the sublime together with opposite phenomenon of charming limits the aesthetic dimension within which artistically formed beauty appears in an aesthetically narrower meaning.

The modern age and a sense of presence

In this paper, the idea of human existence is related to current issues of identities within a complex, technologically globalized modern world. Kierkegaard?s discourse seems very useful in this regard, because of its vivid narrative about obstacles arrising from the superficial offerings of freedom and knowledge that essentially supress the individual?s inner development. By conceptualizing existence and reason as polarities of human experience, it is not possible to implement the existential immediacy of the relationship between knowable structure of Being and the living issues of human beings. That is why, I sugest, their relating, which emerges from the qualitative nature of the state of presence - simultaneously belonging to individual?s interiority and to the external world - is of great importance.

Folk psychology, eliminativism, and the present state of connectionism

Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul Churchland, a radical opponent of folk psychology and a prominent supporter of eliminative materialism. I aim to examine whether current connectionist models based on long-short term memory (LSTM) neural networks can back up these arguments in favor of eliminativism. Nonetheless, I will rather put my faith in the eliminativism of the limited domain. This position amount to the following claim: even though that connectionist cognitive science has no need whatsoever for folk psychology qua theory, this does not entail illegitimacy of folk psychology per se in other scientific domains, most notably in humanities, but only if one sees folk psychology as mere heuristics.

The separation of church and state as the foundation of religious toleration in Locke’s political thought

The subject of this paper will be the analysis of the question of religious toleration in the political thought of seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke. The first part of the paper will discuss the foundational principles of Locke?s political thought, particularly his contract theory. The second part will be dedicated to situating his positions on freedom of religion within the domain of that theory, accentuating the moment of separation between church and state. The final part will analyze the implications of religious toleration, as well as its limits, upon which Locke?s criterion of freedom of religion will be critically examined.

Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity

Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.

Williams on the problem of moral integrity

In this paper, we have tried to point out the importance of the problem of moral integrity in ethical theory. The best way to make an introduction to ethical weighing when it comes to the problem of moral integrity is to analyze the dispute initiated by Bernard Williams. Namely, this is a critique of the act utilitarianism, whose essential weight is precisely on the topic of moral integrity. Williams conceived his objection as saying that there was no place for the value of moral integrity within the act utilitarianism. The treatment of moral integrity is the point of radical disagreement between utilitarianism and deontological ethics. In this way, deciding between utilitarianism and an alternative ethical position, we are actually deciding in favor or against the affirmation of the values of moral integrity. This is a very significant decision when it comes to ethical position. This paper is part of a broader topic on the place of moral integrity in ethical theory, where we have argued that utilitarianism is not the optimal ethical position, precisely because it does not affirm the value of the moral integrity of the individual. This paper is a preparation of such an attitude and has a more modest ambition - it deals with the re-examination of the perception of moral integrity within a utilitarian ethical position.

Divine and angelic cognition in St. Thomas Aquinas

In the first part of the Summa theologiae St. Thomas Aquinas analyzes the cognition in God, angels and human beings; he does that by comparing and juxtaposing them. On the one side, the questions concerning divine cognition, such as the identity of the divine cognition and the divine substance, its nondiscursivity, its scope or future contingents are considered in the articles dedicated to the angels. On the other side, the proper characteristics of the human cognition in the part of the Summa on human soul, such as the active intellect, lack of inborn intelligible species, the inductive procedure in the abstracting from sense cognition, the cognition of the particulars, those problems are analyzed in the part on angelic cognition too. So, there is a structural symmetry of corresponding questions in the Summa on divine, angelic and human cognition.

Sublime in the aesthetics of Nicolai Hartmann and Edmund Burke

This article is dedicated to the interpretation of the aesthetic thought of Nicolai Hartmann and Edmund Burke, that is, the interpretation of their different understandings of the sublime, and its relation to the beautiful. While Hartmann?s sublime is an aesthetic value that is subordinate to the beauty, Burke defines the sublime as a form of aesthetic experience that is on the same level as beautiful. Burke forms an understanding of the sublime based on his analysis of the aesthetic experience, which includes his understanding of passions, states of the soul and the analysis of the sensible qualities of the aesthetic objects, while Hartmann formally considers sublime as one kind of beautiful, and reaches his understanding of it based on his inquiry of the aesthetic object and his definition of beautiful.