scholarly journals Harming Civilians and the Associative Duties of Soldiers

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-600
Author(s):  
Sara Van Goozen
Keyword(s):  



2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (10) ◽  
pp. 57-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosamond Rhodes ◽  
Michael Danziger


2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Christopher Heath Wellman
Keyword(s):  


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have these relationships, if we do not recognise associative duties, before concluding that we should therefore recognise associative duties. I then introduce a nonteleological alternative, grounded in the Appropriate Response approach to ethical theory.



2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Seglow

AbstractThis article examines the conflict between people's associative duties and their wider obligations of global justice. After clarifying the nature of associative duties, it defends the view that such duties may be civic in nature: obtaining between citizens, not just friends and families. Samuel Scheffler's 'distributive objection' to civic associative duties is then presented in the context of global distributive injustice. Three solutions to the objection are considered. One is that the distributive objection is more a philosophical puzzle than a practical problem because of the means by which global justice would be achieved. This is only partially correct. The second reply is that associative duties are additional to citizens' more cosmopolitan duties. This reply loses its purchase if global justice is conceived of in comparative terms. The third reply claims that associative duties are justified by genuine values and do not disappear even when over-ridden by more weighty moral concerns. While in practice, our duties to engineer global justice are likely to over-ride our associative duties in the near future, in ideal circumstances the two kinds of duties can co-exist.



Author(s):  
Jonathan Seglow
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Michael L. Gross

Lacking bed space, Coalition military hospitals in Iraq and Afghanistan declined to admit any civilian except those injured by multinational forces. There are, however, no firm moral grounds for granting collateral casualties a special right to medical attention. Military necessity justifies preferential care for civilians who can contribute to a counterinsurgency, not those suffering collateral damage. Money, not medicine, is a better vehicle to assuage resentment among wounded civilians. Considering the rights of compatriots, allies, civilians, and detainees, five ethical principles govern the distribution of medical care during war: military-medical necessity, associative duties, liability for collateral or accidental harm, beneficence, and urgent medical need. Judging by the number of patients each principle reaches, the cost of care, and the feasibility of implementation, necessity and associative duties best serve military medicine. Once patients assemble by identity and military status, urgent medical need governs care within each group.



2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (09) ◽  
pp. 51-4958-51-4958
Keyword(s):  


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