Care and Compensation for Civilian Victims of War

Lacking bed space, Coalition military hospitals in Iraq and Afghanistan declined to admit any civilian except those injured by multinational forces. There are, however, no firm moral grounds for granting collateral casualties a special right to medical attention. Military necessity justifies preferential care for civilians who can contribute to a counterinsurgency, not those suffering collateral damage. Money, not medicine, is a better vehicle to assuage resentment among wounded civilians. Considering the rights of compatriots, allies, civilians, and detainees, five ethical principles govern the distribution of medical care during war: military-medical necessity, associative duties, liability for collateral or accidental harm, beneficence, and urgent medical need. Judging by the number of patients each principle reaches, the cost of care, and the feasibility of implementation, necessity and associative duties best serve military medicine. Once patients assemble by identity and military status, urgent medical need governs care within each group.

Civil disobedience, and what else? Making space for uncivil forms of resistance

Theorists of political obligation have long devoted special attention to civil disobedience, establishing its pride of place as an object of philosophical analysis, and as one of a short list of exceptions to an otherwise binding obligation to obey the law. Yet all of this attention to civil disobedience has left the broader terrain of resistance to injustice relatively under-theorized. What other forms of action are justifiable – even required – in the face of systemic injustice? Candice Delmas' A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil offers an original and powerful defense of the idea that we have a duty to resist, and that carrying out this duty may sometimes require going beyond civil disobedience – engaging in forms of action that are evasive, shocking, violent, or otherwise deemed “uncivil.” Building on a wealth of recent scholarship and a rich set of examples, Delmas grounds the duty to resist in the same principles that political philosophers routinely use to defend an obligation to obey the law: the natural duty of justice, the principle of fair play, Samaritan duties to rescue others from peril, and the associative duties of membership. In making room for uncivil forms of dissent, however, I contend that Delmas ironically hollows out the category of civil disobedience, wedding it too tightly to a principle of decorum, and isolating it from protest that exceeds the boundaries of the communicative. Nevertheless, A Duty to Resist is an excellent – and much needed – contribution to the literature on dissent and disobedience.

A Duty to Resist

What are our responsibilities in the face of injustice? Many philosophers argue for what is called political obligation—the duty to obey the law of nearly just, legitimate states. Even proponents of civil disobedience generally hold that, given this moral duty, breaking the law requires justification. By contrast, activists from Henry David Thoreau to the Movement for Black Lives have long recognized a responsibility to resist injustice. Taking seriously this activism, this book wrestles with the problem of political obligation in real world societies that harbor injustice. It argues that the very grounds supporting a duty to obey the law—grounds such as the natural duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and associative duties—also impose obligations of resistance under unjust social conditions. The work therefore expands political obligation to include a duty to resist injustice even in legitimate states, and further shows that under certain real-world conditions, this duty to resist demands principled disobedience. Against the mainstream in public, legal, and philosophical discourse, the book argues that such disobedience need not always be civil. Sometimes, covert, violent, evasive, or offensive acts of lawbreaking can be justified, even required. Illegal assistance to undocumented migrants, leaks of classified information, hacktivism sabotage, armed self-defense, guerrilla art, and other modes of resistance are viable and even necessary forms of resistance. There are limits: principle alone does not justify lawbreaking. But uncivil disobedience can sometimes be required in the effort to resist injustice.

The Justification of Associative Duties

People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have these relationships, if we do not recognise associative duties, before concluding that we should therefore recognise associative duties. I then introduce a nonteleological alternative, grounded in the Appropriate Response approach to ethical theory.