The Socialization of Conflict and Its Limits: Gender and Gun Politics in America*

2017 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 455-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristin A. Goss
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer D. Carlson

2016 ◽  
pp. 229-245
Author(s):  
David DeGrazia ◽  
Lester H. Hunt

2020 ◽  
pp. 136078042092224
Author(s):  
Todd C Couch

In recent years, colleges and universities in the United States have considered allowing concealed firearms on their campuses. Yet, substantive research on why a minority of students’ desire to arm themselves is scarce. Addressing this gap in the literature, this study examines 30 interviews with chapter presidents of a national student gun rights organization. Using racialized narratives, participants express intense feelings of vulnerability on campus and in the larger society. Extending Feagin’s theory of systemic racism to gun politics, I argue respondents’ belief that they must be armed to co-exist with people of color reproduces racial inequality and poses a potential threat to students, faculty, and staff of color.


The Gun Gap ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 101-126
Author(s):  
Mark R. Joslyn

Chapter 4 examines people’s feelings about gun safety and the connection to gun policy preferences. Those who feel safe around guns are strong supporters of gun rights legislation. Those who feel threatened and not safe around guns prefer strict gun regulations. Personal experiences with guns and the prevalence of guns in people’s social lives are key factors that influence whether people perceive guns as dangerous and a threat to their well-being or safe and a means of protection. Feelings about personal safety or threat are palpable and animate the gun debate in American politics. Given the strong ties between such feelings and gun policy preferences, it is not surprising gun politics are often heated and end in stalemate.


2017 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald P. Haider-Markel ◽  
Mark R. Joslyn
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessie Bullock

Why do politicians cooperate with organized criminal groups? Existing accounts explore such groups’ incentives to cooperate, but largely treat politicians as either victims of violence or passive bribe takers. This paper considers why politicians may seek criminals’ help to get votes. I argue that some politicians win by using an electoral strategy called criminal clientelism. Politicians hire criminal groups as brokers to deliver votes through two mechanisms: (1) corralling mobilizes groups of residents to the polls and (2) gatekeeping prevents rival candidates from accessing voters. I use a natural experiment that leverages exogenous variation in voter assignment to ballot boxes and a novel dataset on criminal governance to test my theory in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. I show that corralling increases turnout and influences vote choice, and gatekeeping restricts the candidate pool. Together, the mechanisms underpinning criminal clientelism decrease competitiveness and increase the probability of victory for criminally allied candidates.


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