Shared, Regional Repositories: Developing a Practical Implementation Strategy

Author(s):  
Ewoud Verhoef ◽  
Charles McCombie ◽  
Neil Chapman

The basic concept within both EC funded SAPIERR I and SAPIERR II projects (FP6) is that of one or more geological repositories developed in collaboration by two or more European countries to accept spent nuclear fuel, vitrified high-level waste and other long-lived radioactive waste from those partner countries. The SAPIERR II project (Strategic Action Plan for Implementation of Regional European Repositories) examines in detail issues that directly influence the practicability and acceptability of such facilities. This paper describes the work in the SAPIERR II project (2006–2008) on the development of a possible practical implementation strategy for shared, regional repositories in Europe and lays out the first steps in implementing that strategy.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 10780
Author(s):  
Anna V. Matveenko ◽  
Andrey P. Varlakov ◽  
Alexander A. Zherebtsov ◽  
Alexander V. Germanov ◽  
Ivan V. Mikheev ◽  
...  

Pyrochemistry is a promising technology that can provide benefits for the safe reprocessing of relatively fresh spent nuclear fuel with a short storage time (3–5 years). The radioactive waste emanating from this process is an electrolyte (LiCl–KCl) mixture with fission products included. Such wastes are rarely immobilized through common matrices such as cement and glass. In this study, samples of ceramic materials, based on natural bentonite clay, were studied as matrices for radioactive waste in the form of LiCl–KCl eutectic. The phase composition of the samples, and their mechanical, hydrolytic, and radiation resistance were characterized. The possibility of using bentonite clay as a material for immobilizing high-level waste arising from pyrochemical processing of spent nuclear fuel is further discussed in this paper.


2017 ◽  
pp. 38-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Shestopalov ◽  
Iu. Shybetskyi

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the state of geological repository development in Ukraine for the disposal of high-level waste and, possibly, of spent nuclear fuel. The data on state policy, activities and plans for disposal of radioactive waste, as well as on the results of scientific research aimed at the development of a geological repository are summarized. These data include siting, development of geological disposal concepts and safety assessment of selected concepts. Based on the analysis of the listed data, the main problems and further actions are identified.


Author(s):  
John Rowat

Storage and disposal of radioactive waste are complementary rather than competing activities, and both are required for the safe management of wastes. Storage has been carried out safely within the past few decades, and there is a high degree of confidence that it can be continued safely for limited periods of time. However, as the amounts of radioactive waste in surface storage have increased, concern has grown over the sustainability of storage in the long term and the associated safety and security implications. In response to these concerns, the IAEA has prepared a position paper [1] that is intended for general readership. This presentation will provide a summary of the position paper, and a discussion of some safety issues for further consideration. A key theme is the contrast of the safety and sustainability implications of long term storage with those of early disposal. A number of factors are examined from different points of view, factors such as safety and security, need of maintenance, institutional control and information transfer, community attitudes and availability of funding. The timing and duration of the process of moving from storage to disposal, which are influenced by factors such as the long timeframes required to implement disposal and changing public attitudes, will also be discussed. The position paper focuses on the storage of three main types of waste: high level waste from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel that is regarded as waste and long-lived intermediate level radioactive waste. Long term storage of mining and milling waste, and other large volumes of waste from processes involving the use of naturally occurring radioactive materials are not discussed. Specialist meetings were held last year by the IAEA on the sustainability and safety of long-term storage to establish and discuss the issues where a broad consensus exists, and to investigate areas where issues remain unresolved. Within the technical community, it is widely agreed that perpetual storage is not considered to be either feasible or acceptable because of the impossibility of assuring active control over the time periods for which these wastes remain potentially hazardous. For high-level and long-lived radioactive waste, the consensus of the waste management experts is that disposal in deep underground engineered facilities — geological disposal — is the best option that is currently available, or likely to be available in the foreseeable future.


Author(s):  
William H. Lake ◽  
Nancy Slater-Thompson ◽  
Ned Larson ◽  
Franchone Oshinowo

Technology development activities are being conducted by the Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to support spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transport to the federal repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada in 2010. The paper discusses the motivation for pursuing transport technologies for a private sector operated transportation program, and describes some of the current technologies being pursued.


Author(s):  
A. Meleshyn ◽  
U. Noseck

The primary aim of the present work was to determine the inventories of the radionuclides and stable elements in vitrified high-level waste produced at La Hague and delivered to Germany, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive wastes. For a subset of these radionuclides and stable elements, the inventories were determined — either by direct measurements or by involving established correlations — and reported by AREVA. This allowed verification of the validity of application of a model approach utilizing the data of burnup and activation calculations and auxiliary information on the reprocessing and vitrification process operated at La Hague. Having proved that such a model approach can be applied for prediction of inventories of actinides, fission and activation products in vitrified waste, the present work estimated the minimum, average and maximum inventories of the radionuclides, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive waste but were not reported by AREVA for delivered CSD-V canisters. The average and maximum inventories in individual CSD-V canisters predicted in the present approach were compared to the inventories predicted by Nagra for canisters with vitrified waste delivered from La Hague to Switzerland [1]. This comparison revealed a number of differences between these inventories despite the fact that the canisters delivered to Switzerland were produced in essentially the same way and from the common reprocessing waste stock as CSD-V canisters delivered to Germany. Therefore, a further work is required in order to identify the reason for the discrepancy in the present estimation versus the Nagra estimation [1]. Such a work should also address the recommendation by the international peer review of the Safety Report of the Project Opalinus Clay to obtain estimates of the inventories of long-lived mobile radionuclides (such as 14C, 36Cl, 79Se, and 129I), which contribute most to the dose estimates in the radiological safety assessments, if possible, in agreement with other countries with similar waste streams in order for a coordinated set of data to be generated [2]. Since vitrified waste from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at La Hague was delivered to several countries — Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland — an international effort can be recommended.


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