scholarly journals Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier

Author(s):  
Sepehr Assadi ◽  
Thomas Kesselheim ◽  
Sahil Singla
2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cramton ◽  
Yoav Shoham ◽  
Richard Steinberg

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 32-37
Author(s):  
Paul Dütting ◽  
Thomas Kesselheim ◽  
Brendan Lucier

Queue ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 37-51
Author(s):  
Terence Kelly

Expectations run high for software that makes real-world decisions, particularly when money hangs in the balance. This third episode of the Drill Bits column shows how well-designed software can effectively create wealth by optimizing gains from trade in combinatorial auctions. We'll unveil a deep connection between auctions and a classic textbook problem, we'll see that clearing an auction resembles a high-stakes mutant Tetris, we'll learn to stop worrying and love an NP-hard problem that's far from intractable in practice, and we'll contrast the deliberative business of combinatorial auctions with the near-real-time hustle of high-frequency trading. The example software that accompanies this installment of Drill Bits implements two algorithms that clear combinatorial auctions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document