THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
2007 ◽
Vol 09
(03)
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pp. 437-452
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Keyword(s):
This paper studies a procedural and axiomatic extension of the consensus value [cf. Ju et al. (2007)] to the class of partition function form games. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that the consensus value satisfies individual rationality under a superadditivity condition, and well balances the tradeoff between coalitional effects and externality effects. In this respect, explicit differences with other solution concepts are indicated.
2007 ◽
Vol 09
(02)
◽
pp. 353-360
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2006 ◽
Vol 42
(6)
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pp. 771-793
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2015 ◽
Vol 17
(03)
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pp. 1550003
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