scholarly journals An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form

SERIEs ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng-Cheng Hu ◽  
Yi-You Yang
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Function Form ◽  
A Value ◽  
Partition Function Form

AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 63-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. ALBIZURI ◽  
J. ARIN ◽  
J. RUBIO
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Function Form ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Partition Function Form

Lucas and Trall (1963) defined the games in partition function form as a generalization of the cooperative games with transferable utility. In our work we propose by means of an axiomatic characterization a solution for such games in partition function form. This solution will be a generalization of the Shapley value (1953).

COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 329-338
Author(s):  
E. FUKUDA ◽  
S. H. TIJS ◽  
R. BRÂNZEI ◽  
S. MUTO
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Extensive Form Games ◽  
Compromise Value ◽  
Partition Function Form Games ◽  
Partition Function Form

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f. game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided. Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced. For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation. It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.

A Note on a Class of Solutions for Games with Externalities Generalizing the Shapley Value

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joss Sánchez-Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Complete Characterization ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Characterization Result ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Games With Externalities ◽  
Partition Function Form

In this paper we study a family of extensions of the Shapley value for games in partition function form with n players. In particular, we provide a complete characterization for all linear, symmetric, efficient and null solutions in these environments. Finally, we relate our characterization result with other ways to extend the Shapley value in the literature.

Book Reviews

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-215
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Drexel University ◽  
New Concepts ◽  
University Of Manchester ◽  
Transferable Utility Games ◽  
Partition Function Form

Omer Edhan of University of Manchester reviews, “Value Solutions in Cooperative Games” by Roger A. McCain. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents new concepts for cooperative game theory, with a particular focus on solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. Discusses value solutions for superadditive transferable utility games in coalition function form; Zeuthen–Nash bargaining; nontransferable utility games and games in partition function form; a Shapley value algorithm for games in partition function form; extension of the nucleolus to nontransferable utility games in partition function form; a core imputation with variable bargaining power; bargaining power biform games; intertemporal cooperative games—a sketch of a theory; and a theory of enterprise. McCain is at Drexel University.”

scholarly journals THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 353-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIM HANG PHAM DO ◽  
HENK NORDE
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Partition Function Form Games ◽  
Partition Function Form

Different axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU games can be found in the literature. The Shapley value has been generalized in several ways to the class of games in partition function form. In this paper we discuss another generalization of the Shapley value and provide a characterization.

THE CLASS OF EFFICIENT LINEAR SYMMETRIC VALUES FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (03) ◽  
pp. 369-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. HERNÁNDEZ-LAMONEDA ◽  
J. SÁNCHEZ-PÉREZ ◽  
F. SÁNCHEZ-SÁNCHEZ
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Efficient Solutions ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Additional Axiom ◽  
Partition Function Form

In this paper we study linear symmetric solutions for the space of games in partition function form with n players. In particular, we provide an expression for all linear, symmetric and efficient solutions. Furthermore, adding an additional axiom, we identify a unique value satisfying these properties.

The core of a strategic game

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Parkash Chander
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Strategic Game ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Cooperative Solution ◽  
Payoff Vector ◽  
The Core ◽  
Partition Function Form

AbstractIn this paper, I introduce and study the $\gamma$-core of a general strategic game. I first show that the $\gamma$-core of an arbitrary strategic game is smaller than the conventional $\alpha$- and $\beta$- cores. I then consider the partition function form of a general strategic game and show that a prominent class of partition function games admit nonempty $\gamma$-cores. Finally, I show that each $\gamma$-core payoff vector (a cooperative solution) can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of an intuitive non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the $\gamma$-core is non-empty.

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