A SIMPLE AXIOMATIZATION OF THE EGALITARIAN SOLUTION

In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of the n-person egalitarian solution. The single condition sufficient for characterization is a new axiom, called symmetric decomposability that combines the axioms of step-by-step negotiations, symmetry, and weak Pareto optimality used in an early characterization by Kalai [(1977) Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons, Econometrica45, 1623–1630].

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A new characterization of (weak) Pareto optimality for differentiable vector optimization problems with G-invex functions

Mathematical and Computer Modelling ◽

10.1016/j.mcm.2011.01.034 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 54 (1-2) ◽

pp. 59-68 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Tadeusz Antczak

Keyword(s):

Vector Optimization ◽

Pareto Optimality ◽

Optimization Problems ◽

Vector Optimization Problems ◽

Invex Functions ◽

Weak Pareto Optimality ◽

Differentiable Vector

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Weak Pareto optimality and the approximate support property

Journal of Mathematical Economics ◽

10.1016/0304-4068(93)90030-o ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 22 (1) ◽

pp. 61-71 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Robert A. Becker ◽

Hari Bercovici ◽

Ciprian Foias

Keyword(s):

Pareto Optimality ◽

Weak Pareto Optimality ◽

Support Property

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On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization ◽

10.1007/s10878-020-00539-7 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Xujin Chen ◽

Zhuo Diao ◽

Xiaodong Hu

Keyword(s):

Pareto Optimality ◽

Weak Pareto Optimality

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Weak Pareto optimality of multiobjective problems in a locally convex linear topological space

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications ◽

10.1007/bf00935888 ◽

1981 ◽

Vol 34 (4) ◽

pp. 469-484 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

M. Minami

Keyword(s):

Topological Space ◽

Pareto Optimality ◽

Linear Topological Space ◽

Weak Pareto Optimality ◽

Multiobjective Problems ◽

Locally Convex

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LEARNING BARGAINING CONVENTIONS

Social Philosophy and Policy ◽

10.1017/s0265052518000110 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 35 (1) ◽

pp. 237-263 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Peter Vanderschraaf

Keyword(s):

Focal Point ◽

Inductive Learning ◽

Fair Division ◽

Bargaining Problem ◽

Nash Bargaining ◽

Division Problems ◽

Egalitarian Solution ◽

Bargaining Problems ◽

Nash Bargaining Problem ◽

Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

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