Dynamic Bargaining and Time-Consistency in Linear-State and Homogeneous Linear-Quadratic Cooperative Differential Games
Keyword(s):
Three different solution concepts are reviewed and computed for linear-state and homogeneous linear-quadratic cooperative differential games with asymmetric players. Discount rates can be nonconstant and/or different. Special attention is paid to the issues of time-consistency, agreeability and subgame-perfectness, both from the viewpoint of sustainability of cooperation and from the credibility of the announced equilibrium strategies.
2005 ◽
Vol 126
(2)
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pp. 367-389
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2003 ◽
Vol 119
(1)
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pp. 49-63
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2020 ◽
Vol 13
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pp. 244-251
2008 ◽
Vol 46
(1)
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pp. 81-92
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2009 ◽
pp. 1-31
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2005 ◽
Vol 07
(04)
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pp. 395-406
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2020 ◽
Vol 26
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pp. 41