Design Guidelines for Cooperative UAV-supported Services and Applications

Internet of Things (IoT) systems have advanced greatly in the past few years, especially with the support of Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) solutions. Numerous AI-supported IoT devices are playing a significant role in providing complex and user-specific smart city services. Given the multitude of heterogeneous wireless networks, the plethora of computer and storage architectures and paradigms, and the abundance of mobile and vehicular IoT devices, true smart city experiences are only attainable through a cooperative intelligent and secure IoT framework. This article provides an extensive study on different cooperative systems and envisions a cooperative solution that supports the integration and collaboration among both centralized and distributed systems, in which intelligent AI-supported IoT devices such as smart UAVs provide support in the data collection, processing and service provisioning process. Moreover, secure and collaborative decentralized solutions such as Blockchain are considered in the service provisioning process to enable enhanced privacy and authentication features for IoT applications. As such, user-specific complex services and applications within smart city environments will be delivered and made available in a timely, secure, and efficient manner.

Marketing Resource Allocation Strategy Optimization Based on Dynamic Game Model

Game theory has become an important tool to study the competition between oligopolistic enterprises. After combing the existing literature, it is found that there is no research combining two-stage game and nonlinear dynamics to analyze the competition between enterprises for advertising. Therefore, this paper establishes a two-stage game model to discuss the effect of the degree of firms’ advertising input on their profits. And the complexity of the system is analyzed using nonlinear dynamics. This paper analyzes and studies the dynamic game for two types of application network models: data transmission model and transportation network model. Under the time-gap ALOHA protocol, the noncooperative behavior of the insiders in the dynamic data transmission stochastic game is examined as well as the cooperative behavior. In this paper, the existence of Nash equilibrium and its solution algorithm are proved in the noncooperative case, and the “subgame consistency” of the cooperative solution (Shapley value) is discussed in the cooperative case, and the cooperative solution satisfying the subgame consistency is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure.” The cooperative solution is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure” to satisfy the subgame consistency. In this paper, we propose to classify the packets transmitted by the source nodes, and by changing the strategy of the source nodes at the states with different kinds of packets, we find that the equilibrium payment of the insider increases in the noncooperative game with the addition of the “wait” strategy. In the transportation dynamic network model, the problem of passenger flow distribution and the selection of service parameters of transportation companies are also studied, and a two-stage game theoretical model is proposed to solve the equilibrium price and optimal parameters under Wardrop’s criterion.

Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games and Tragedy of Cross-Generational Environmental Commons

Different entry and exit times and overlapping generations of players are common in real-life game situations. In addition, durable strategies which have effects over a period of time are no less common than nondurable strategies which have only one-shot effects. This paper develops a new class of dynamic games which contains durable strategies with asynchronous players’ horizons. The optimization techniques for solving asynchronous horizons durable strategies control are derived. Noncooperative game equilibria and cooperative optimal solution are presented. An asynchronous horizons durable strategies dynamic environmental game is provided to analyze the seemingly catastrophe-bound environmental degradation problem. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) in cross-generational exploitation of environmental commons is calibrated. A cooperative solution with a dynamically stable compensatory scheme is presented to alleviate the problem.

Time-Consistency of an Imputation in a Cooperative Hybrid Differential Game

This work is aimed at studying the problem of maintaining the sustainability of a cooperative solution in an n-person hybrid differential game. Specifically, we consider a differential game whose payoff function is discounted with a discounting function that changes its structure with time. We solve the problem of time-inconsistency of the cooperative solution using a so-called imputation distribution procedure, which was adjusted for this general class of differential games. The obtained results are illustrated with a specific example of a differential game with random duration and a hybrid cumulative distribution function (CDF). We completely solved the presented example to demonstrate the application of the developed scheme in detail. All results were obtained in analytical form and illustrated by numerical simulations.

Cooperative differential game model with continuous updating

The paper considers and describes the class of cooperative differential games with continuous updating. Such a class of differential games is new, at the moment only the classnoncooperative game models with continuous updating have been studied. This paper describes the process of constructing cooperative strategies, cooperative trajectory, characteristicfunction and cooperative solution with continuous updating. Cooperative case of limited resource extraction game model with continuous updating is considered. Optimal strategies,characteristic function and cooperative solution are constructed. The Shapley vector is used as a cooperative solution. The numerical simulation results are demonstrated in the Matlabenvironment.

Stochastic model of network formation with asymmetric players

We propose a model of a network formation using the theory of stochastic games with random terminal time. Initially, the leader proposes a joint project in the form of a network to the players. Then, the players have the opportunities to form new links with each other to update the network proposed by the leader. Any player's payoff at any stage is determined by the network structure. It is also assumed that the formation of links proposed by the players is random. The duration of the game is also random. As a result of the players' actions and the implementation of the random steps of the Nature, a network is formed. We consider a cooperative approach to network formation, and we use the CIS-value as a cooperative solution. In this paper, a recurrent formula for its derivation in any cooperative subgame is obtained. The paper also investigates the dynamic consistency of CIS-value. The theoretical results are demonstrated by a numerical example.

On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions

We consider n-person pure bargaining games in which the space of feasible payoffs is constructed via a normal form differential game. At the beginning of the game the agents bargain over strategies to be played over an infinite time horizon. An initial cooperative solution (a strategy tuple) is called subgame individually rational (SIR) if it remains individually rational throughout the entire game and time consistent (TC) if renegotiating it at a later time instant yields the original solution. For a class of linear-state differential games we show that any solution which is individually rational at the beginning of the game satisfies SIR and TC if the space of admissible cooperative strategies is restricted to constants. We discuss an application from environmental economics.

Forms of Cooperation of Lithuanian Forest Owners: A Case Review

There are many ways for private forest owners (PFOs) to manage their properties. One way is to manage it by oneself, to use the individual approach; however, our focus is on a cooperative solution, which, in many cases, is much more challenging due to the incorporation of multiple players and the structure of their forests, not to mention the needs and objectives related to forest management. Cooperative forest management has different forms, as shown by numerous socio-economic theoretical and empirical findings. This paper discusses how the traditional organisational forms of cooperation among Lithuanian forest owners are operating and more specifically, how they are adopting their performance in addressing the goals of forest management. A case study is used to show how cooperation among private forest owners has been developing in Lithuania over recent years and finds some new forms of cooperational management.

Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games

We consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where n players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a modified bargaining scheme that guarantees the fulfillment of rationality conditions is applied. The concept of dynamic stability is adopted for dynamic multicriteria games. To stabilize the multicriteria cooperative solution a time-consistent payoff distribution procedure is constructed. The conditions for rational behavior, namely irrational-behavior-proofness condition and each step rational behavior condition are defined for dynamic multicriteria games. To illustrate the presented approaches, a dynamic bi-criteria bioresource management problem with many players is investigated.

Transaction Cost and the Theory of Games: The “Prisoners’ Dilemma” as an Example

Since mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern introduced the theory of games as a branch of modern mathematics into Economics, it has become rather prevalent, and it is even thought to be able to rewrite the whole microeconomics, that is to say, replace the frame of economic theory found by Marshall in “Principles of Economics”. But this paper will show that there are two frauds in the “Prisoners’ Dilemma”, one of the classical models in the theory of games. One is the missing calculation of costs of “cooperative solution”, the other is invalidity of “cooperative solution” when adopted to explain the phenomenon in economy or business field, because of misleading by the wrong definition of Monopoly. Oligarchs cannot increase the monophonic degree, even if they cooperate or collide to decrease the productions. But the fundamental problem of the prisoners’ dilemma lies in ad hoc theory. There are transaction costs in cooperation, which is the key constraint. Some special ways (such as repeated game) to decrease transaction costs in special cases are not key factors. This problem exists in all models of the theory of games, so it is its Achilles’ heel.