Credibility of Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-State Differential Games

2005 ◽  
Vol 126 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Martín-Herrán ◽  
G. Zaccour
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Linear State ◽  
Incentive Equilibrium

Dynamic Bargaining and Time-Consistency in Linear-State and Homogeneous Linear-Quadratic Cooperative Differential Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús Marín-Solano
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Time Consistency ◽  
Discount Rates ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Dynamic Bargaining ◽  
Linear State ◽  
Homogeneous Linear ◽  
Cooperative Differential Games

Three different solution concepts are reviewed and computed for linear-state and homogeneous linear-quadratic cooperative differential games with asymmetric players. Discount rates can be nonconstant and/or different. Special attention is paid to the issues of time-consistency, agreeability and subgame-perfectness, both from the viewpoint of sustainability of cooperation and from the credibility of the announced equilibrium strategies.

Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games

2003 ◽  
Vol 119 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Jørgensen ◽  
G. Martín-Herrán ◽  
G. Zaccour
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Time Consistency ◽  
Linear State

Incentive equilibrium strategies in dynamic games played over event trees

Automatica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 50-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elnaz Kanani Kuchesfehani ◽  
Georges Zaccour
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Event Trees ◽  
Incentive Equilibrium

scholarly journals On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-97
Author(s):  
Simon Hoof ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Time Horizon ◽  
Time Instant ◽  
Infinite Time ◽  
Cooperative Solution ◽  
Original Solution ◽  
Bargaining Solutions ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Linear State

We consider n-person pure bargaining games in which the space of feasible payoffs is constructed via a normal form differential game. At the beginning of the game the agents bargain over strategies to be played over an infinite time horizon. An initial cooperative solution (a strategy tuple) is called subgame individually rational (SIR) if it remains individually rational throughout the entire game and time consistent (TC) if renegotiating it at a later time instant yields the original solution. For a class of linear-state differential games we show that any solution which is individually rational at the beginning of the game satisfies SIR and TC if the space of admissible cooperative strategies is restricted to constants. We discuss an application from environmental economics.

Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950006
Author(s):  
Simon Hoof
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Function Form ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Noncooperative Equilibrium ◽  
Pollution Accumulation ◽  
Linear State ◽  
Partition Function Form ◽  
Cooperative Differential Games

We introduce a partition function for [Formula: see text]-player linear-state cooperative differential games. The value of a coalition within a given coalition structure is defined as its noncooperative equilibrium payoff of a game played between the coalitions. We also define two core notions, namely, the cautious and the singleton core. If the game is convex, then the cores are nonempty. In order to illustrate the approach, we consider a symmetric game of pollution accumulation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document