scholarly journals Backward stochastic differential equations with unbounded generators

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bujar Gashi ◽  
Jiajie Li

In this paper, we consider two classes of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). First, under a Lipschitz-type condition on the generator of the equation, which can also be unbounded, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique solution pair. The method of proof is that of Picard iterations and the resulting conditions are new. We also prove a comparison theorem. Second, under the linear growth and continuity assumptions on the possibly unbounded generator, we prove the existence of the solution pair. This class of equations is more general than the existing ones.

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (03) ◽  
pp. 1950020
Author(s):  
Masaaki Fujii ◽  
Akihiko Takahashi

In this paper, we study a class of Anticipated Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (ABSDE) with jumps. The solution of the ABSDE is a triple [Formula: see text] where [Formula: see text] is a semimartingale, and [Formula: see text] are the diffusion and jump coefficients. We allow the driver of the ABSDE to have linear growth on the uniform norm of [Formula: see text]’s future paths, as well as quadratic and exponential growth on the spot values of [Formula: see text], respectively. The existence of the unique solution is proved for Markovian and non-Markovian settings with different structural assumptions on the driver. In the former case, some regularities on [Formula: see text] with respect to the forward process are also obtained.


2011 ◽  
Vol 50-51 ◽  
pp. 288-292
Author(s):  
Shi Qiu Zheng ◽  
Dian Chuan Jin ◽  
Shuai Zhang ◽  
Yan Mei Yang ◽  
Jin Peng Wang

In this paper, we mainly study the properties of solutions of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) driven by a simple Lévy process, whose coefficient coeffcient is continuous with linear growth. A comparison theorem for solutions of the equations are obtained, we also show the equation has either one or uncountably many solutions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 524-527 ◽  
pp. 3801-3804
Author(s):  
Shi Yu Li ◽  
Wu Jun Gao ◽  
Jin Hui Wang

ƒIn this paper, we study the one-dimensional backward stochastic equations driven by continuous local martingale. We establish a generalized the comparison theorem for any solutions where the coefficient is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in z and is equi-continuous in y.


2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 878-898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel N. Cohen ◽  
Robert J. Elliott ◽  
Charles E. M. Pearce

A useful result when dealing with backward stochastic differential equations is the comparison theorem of Peng (1992). When the equations are not based on Brownian motion, the comparison theorem no longer holds in general. In this paper we present a condition for a comparison theorem to hold for backward stochastic differential equations based on arbitrary martingales. This theorem applies to both vector and scalar situations. Applications to the theory of nonlinear expectations are also explored.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 77
Author(s):  
Qun Shi

In this paper we consider one dimensional generalized mean-field backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) driven by fractional Brownian motion, i.e., the generators of our mean-field FBSDEs depend not only on the solution but also on the law of the solution. We first give a totally new comparison theorem for such type of BSDEs under Lipschitz condition. Furthermore, we study the existence of the solution of such mean-field FBSDEs when the coefficients are only continuous and with a linear growth.


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Aurell

In this paper, mean-field type games between two players with backward stochastic dynamics are defined and studied. They make up a class of non-zero-sum, non-cooperating, differential games where the players’ state dynamics solve backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE) that depend on the marginal distributions of player states. Players try to minimize their individual cost functionals, also depending on the marginal state distributions. Under some regularity conditions, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria. Player behavior is illustrated by numerical examples, and is compared to a centrally planned solution where the social cost, the sum of player costs, is minimized. The inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, compared to socially optimal behavior, is quantified by the so-called price of anarchy. Numerical simulations of the price of anarchy indicate how the improvement in social cost achievable by a central planner depends on problem parameters.


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