Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values

Tim Roughgarden; Inbal Talgam-Cohen

doi:10.1145/2910577

Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation ◽

10.1145/2910577 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 4 (3) ◽

pp. 1-34 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Tim Roughgarden ◽

Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Keyword(s):

Mechanism Design ◽

Interdependent Values ◽

Robust Mechanism Design

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Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange

The Review of Economic Studies ◽

10.1093/restud/rdaa049 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Pasha Andreyanov ◽

Tomasz Sadzik

Keyword(s):

Mechanism Design ◽

Private Information ◽

Information Structure ◽

Utility Functions ◽

Double Auction ◽

Exchange Economies ◽

Incentive Compatible ◽

Ex Post ◽

Interdependent Values ◽

Robust Mechanism Design

Abstract In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.

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Book Reviews

Journal of Economic Literature ◽

10.1257/jel.54.2.589.r1 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 54 (2) ◽

pp. 589-591

Keyword(s):

Graduate Students ◽

Mechanism Design ◽

Incentive Compatibility ◽

Dominant Strategy ◽

University Of Michigan ◽

Dynamic Mechanism Design ◽

Temple University ◽

The University ◽

Robust Mechanism Design

Dimitrios Diamantaras of Temple University reviews “An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design,” by Tilman Börgers. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design and examines the frontiers of research in mechanism design in a text written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory. Discusses screening; examples of Bayesian mechanism design; examples of dominant strategy mechanisms; incentive compatibility; Bayesian mechanism design; dominant strategy mechanisms; nontransferable utility; informational interdependence; robust mechanism design; and dynamic mechanism design. Börgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan.”

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