Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation ◽

10.1145/3391403.3399535 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Constantinos Daskalakis ◽

Maxwell Fishelson ◽

Brendan Lucier ◽

Vasilis Syrgkanis ◽

Santhoshini Velusamy

Keyword(s):

Optimal Auctions

Get full-text (via PubEx)

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation ◽

10.1145/3391403.3399495 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Matheus V. X. Ferreira ◽

S. Matthew Weinberg

Keyword(s):

Optimal Auctions

Get full-text (via PubEx)

What objective function should be used for optimal auctions in the ISO/RTO electricity market?

2006 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting ◽

10.1109/pes.2006.1709295 ◽

2006 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

G.A. Stern ◽

J.H. Yan ◽

P.B. Luh ◽

W.E. Blankson

Keyword(s):

Objective Function ◽

Electricity Market ◽

Optimal Auctions

Get full-text (via PubEx)

The randomized communication complexity of revenue maximization

ACM SIGecom Exchanges ◽

10.1145/3505156.3505165 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 75-83

Author(s):

Aviad Rubinstein ◽

Junyao Zhao

Keyword(s):

Lower Bounds ◽

Communication Complexity ◽

Social Choice Rule ◽

Valuation Function ◽

Optimal Auctions ◽

Incentive Compatible ◽

First Approximation ◽

Exponential Separation ◽

Open Question

We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items [Rubinstein and Zhao 2021]. Motivated by the fact that revenue-optimal auctions are randomized [Thanassoulis 2004; Manelli and Vincent 2010; Briest et al. 2010; Pavlov 2011; Hart and Reny 2015] (as well as by an open problem of Babaioff, Gonczarowski, and Nisan [Babaioff et al. 2017]), we focus on the randomized communication complexity of this problem (in contrast to most prior work on deterministic communication). We design simple, incentive compatible, and revenue-optimal auction-protocols whose expected communication complexity is much (in fact infinitely) more efficient than their deterministic counterparts. We also give nearly matching lower bounds on the expected communication complexity of approximately-revenue-optimal auctions. These results follow from a simple characterization of incentive compatible auction-protocols that allows us to prove lower bounds against randomized auction-protocols. In particular, our lower bounds give the first approximation-resistant, exponential separation between communication complexity of incentivizing vs implementing a Bayesian incentive compatible social choice rule, settling an open question of Fadel and Segal [Fadel and Segal 2009].

Get full-text (via PubEx)