Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition?

We study anticompetitive horizontal mergers in a dynamic model with noisy collusion. At each instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge to form a monopoly, trading off the benefits of avoiding price wars against the costs of merging. The potential to merge decreases pre-merger collusion, as punishments effected by price wars are weakened. We thus extend the result of Davidson and Deneckere [Davidson C, Deneckere R (1984) Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 2(2):117–132.], who analyzed the weakening of punishments post-merger, demonstrating that pre-merger collusion is weakened, in a fully stochastic model. Thus, although anticompetitive mergers harm competition ex post, the implication is that barriers and costs of merging due to regulation should be reduced to promote competition exante. This paper was accepted by Tomasz Piskorski, finance.

10. Mergers and acquisitions

‘Mergers and acquisitions’ discusses mergers and acquisitions. While of potential benefit to society, mergers, takeovers, share acquisitions, and joint ventures also affect the market structure, and at times may reduce competition. When markets become more concentrated following a merger, we move further away from a competitive market structure to a structure in which market power might undermine the competitive process. To address this risk, the competition agency must assess the impact of the transaction. There are important procedural differences between the European administrative system and the US system in terms of the appraisal of mergers and acquisitions. Other types of mergers include: horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, and conglomerate transactions.