scholarly journals Multiobjective Optimization Method and Application of Tolerance Allocation for the Steam Turbine Based on Cooperative Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Li-li Li ◽  
Kun Chen ◽  
Jian-min Gao ◽  
Jun-kong Liu ◽  
Zhi-yong Gao ◽  
...  

Aiming at the optimization problem of multiple objectives with contradictions and conflicts in the process of allocating the tolerance for complex products, taking advantage of the features of coordinating, and balancing contradictions and conflicts of cooperative game theory, this paper uses cooperative game theory to solve the multiobjective optimization problem of tolerance allocation. The quality requirements and cost requirements of assembly products are used as the game decision parties, and the fuzzy clustering method is used to group the design variables of tolerance allocation problem of the steam turbine to form the strategic space of game parties. Take the quality level and cost level of the assembly product as the optimization goals, complete the calculation of the utilities of the two game parties, and establish the multiobjective optimization model of tolerance allocation based on cooperative game theory. Finally, the Shapley value method based on cooperative game theory, the Nash equilibrium method based on noncooperative game theory, and the traditional single-objective optimization method with the quality as the constraint and the cost as the optimization objective are used to solve the tolerance allocation problem of steam turbine. The solution results show that the method of cooperative game realized the balance, coordination, and comprehensive optimization of the quality and cost from the perspective of collective interests, overcame the shortcomings of the traditional single-objective optimization method, and obtained better result than the Nash equilibrium method.

2003 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sungwhee Shin ◽  
Sang-Chul Suh

We consider the international treaties on climate change as self-enforcing agreements. Applying non-cooperative game theory, we interpret the UN framework Convention on Climate Change as a Nash equilibrium outcome of an international abatement game where only domestic abatement is allowed. The Kyoto Protocol is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game where flexibility mechanisms are introduced. We also show that credit discounting on foreign abatement can Pareto improve the welfare of all countries.


Author(s):  
Cunbin Li ◽  
Ding Liu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
Chunyan Liang

AbstractAdvanced grid technology represented by smart grid and energy internet is the core feature of the next-generation power grid. The next-generation power grid will be a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS), which will have a higher level of risk management due to its flexibility in sensing and control. This paper explains the methods and results of a study on grid CPS’s behavior after risk. Firstly, a behavior model based on hybrid automata is built to simulate grid CPS’s risk decisions. Then, a GCPS risk transfer model based on cooperative game theory is built. The model allows decisions to ignore complex network structures. On this basis, a modified applicant-proposing algorithm to achieve risk optimum is proposed. The risk management model proposed in this paper can provide references for power generation and transmission decision after risk as well as risk aversion, an empirical study in north China verifies its validity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 145 ◽  
pp. 111056
Author(s):  
Andrey Churkin ◽  
Janusz Bialek ◽  
David Pozo ◽  
Enzo Sauma ◽  
Nikolay Korgin

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny Ben-Shahar ◽  
Yongheng Deng ◽  
Eyal Sulganik

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