The Notitia Intuitiva and Notitia Abstractiva of the External Senses in Second Scholasticism: Suárez, Poinsot and Francisco de Oviedo

Vivarium ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 173-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Heider
Keyword(s):  
Fourteenth Century ◽  
William Of Ockham ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Francisco Suarez

This paper analyzes the theories of three representatives of Second Scholasticism, namely Francisco Suárez, sj, John Poinsot, op, and Francisco de Oviedo, sj, on the issue of the intuitive and abstractive cognition of the external senses. Based on a comparison of their theories, linked to the historical starting point of the debate in the first decades of the fourteenth century (Peter Auriol, John Duns Scotus, Francis of Meyronnes, William of Ockham and Walter Chatton), the paper argues that the doctrinal and argumentative matrix of these authors’ texts is significantly ‘present’ in the Second Scholastics as well. 1) As far as naturally produced sensation is concerned, all these authors, including Poinsot, follow the Scotistic justification of the natural infallibility of the external senses; 2) regarding the possibility of supernaturally caused objectless perception, Poinsot’s position can be labelled, surprisingly, Scotistic; 3) Suárez’s theory, although partly similar to the doctrine of the late Ockham, is an idiosyncratic stance; 4) Oviedo’s conception, even more distant from that of Ockham, can be characterized as ‘Auriolian’ and ‘Chattonian’.

Chatton, Walter (c.1290–1343)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen F. Brown
Keyword(s):  
William Of Ockham ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
The Trinity

Chatton was an English philosopher and theologian who developed a detailed critique of the work of William of Ockham, causing the latter to revise some of his earlier writings. Chatton was also at times an opponent of Peter Aureol and Richard of Campsall; he generally, though not always, followed John Duns Scotus and responded to his critics. He is known also for his writings on physics, where he held views in line with those of Pythagoras and Plato, and on the Trinity, where he was strongly attacked by Adam Wodeham.

Wodeham, Adam (c.1298–1358)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rega Wood
Keyword(s):  
William Of Ockham ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Considerable Time ◽  
Duns Scotus

An English Franciscan theologian, Wodeham was preoccupied with logical and semantic questions. He lectured for about a decade on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, first at London, then at Norwich and finally at Oxford. His lectures emphasized the dependence of the created world on God and the contingency of nature and salvation. John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham exerted the most important influences on Wodeham. He regarded Scotus as a vigorous thinker and respected him enough to accept his opinion in case of doubt. Proud to have learned logic from Ockham, Wodeham devoted considerable time to defending Ockham’s views from Walter Chatton, whom he saw as someone whose errors in logic arose from malice as well as ignorance. However, despite Wodeham’s reservations about Chatton, he was considerably influenced by him. Similarly, Wodeham modified his own opinion about sensory illusions in response to Peter Aureol, whom he saw as skilled and prudent but often mistaken, sometimes as a result of faulty logic.

scholarly journals Guilherme de Ockham e o Argumento Anselmiano via Escoto

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (34) ◽  
pp. 309-332
Author(s):  
Maria Leonor L. O. Xavier ◽  
Keyword(s):  
William Of Ockham ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Duns Scotus

Admitting that God is humanly knowable, not in himself, but in concept, William of Ockham examines accurately the nature of our concepts about God. We find here the remaking of anselmian elements, like the attachment and the detachment between the concepts of supreme and insuperable. Then considering the concepts involved in the proposition “God exists”, the Franciscan philosopher takes position for its demonstrability. Within his position takes place the reception of the anselmian argument, which is called the “ratio Anselmi”, in the wake of John Duns Scotus. As a matter of fact, it is through the Doctor Subtilis that the philosopher of Ockham revisitates critically the most well known bequest of the Doctor Magnificus. Duns Scotus had assumed the ratio Anselmi of Proslogion 2, as an argument for God’s infinity. William is an incisive critic of the scotist ways of demonstration of God’s infinity, but he does not exclude completely the possibility of demonstrating the existence of a finite insuperable, in the wake of the scotist interpretation of the ratio Anselmi.

The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism

Vivarium ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter King
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
William Of Ockham ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Psychological Experience ◽  
Faculty Psychology ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
The Will ◽  
Personal Agents

AbstractMediaeval psychological theory was a “faculty psychology”: a confederation of semiautonomous sub-personal agents, the interaction of which constitutes our psychological experience. One such faculty was intellective appetite, that is, the will. On what grounds was the will taken to be a distinct faculty? After a brief survey of Aristotle's criteria for identifying and distinguishing mental faculties, I look in some detail at the mainstream mediaeval view, given clear expression by Thomas Aquinas, and then at the dissenting views of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. I conclude with some reflections on why the mainstream mediaeval view was discarded by Descartes.

Henry of Ghent (early 13th century–1293)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven P. Marrone
Keyword(s):  
Fourteenth Century ◽  
Thirteenth Century ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
13Th Century ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
Henry Of Ghent ◽  
Divine Illumination ◽  
True Knowledge

Perhaps the most influential theologian between Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure in the third quarter of the thirteenth century and John Duns Scotus at the beginning of the fourteenth century, Henry of Ghent stands at a turning point in scholastic philosophy. He was a defender of traditional Neoplatonic positions and has often been seen as the epitome of thirteenth-century Augustinianism. Yet his convoluted metaphysics and a theory of knowledge weaving together Neoplatonic and Aristotelian strands inspired novel philosophical trends in the fourteenth century, particularly among Franciscan thinkers. His work thus constituted the point of departure for scholastic giants like Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, who not only used him as a foil against which to articulate their own system of thought but also absorbed much of his fundamental philosophical outlook and terminology. Characteristic of Henry’s metaphysics was an essentialism so pronounced that critics accused him of positing a realm of essences separate from worldly actuality. In his defence, Henry insisted that essences, though prior to actual existence, were separate only as grounded in the divine exemplars of things, but the Platonism of his approach struck his contemporaries as extraordinary nonetheless. Ironically, Henry’s understanding of essence as congruent with intellectual coherence provided an opening for a more logic-based analysis of modality, especially possibility, in succeeding thinkers such as Duns Scotus. The emphasis on essence re-emerged in Henry’s theory of knowledge, and at least in his early writings he offered a vision of knowing truth through divine illumination often taken as paradigmatic of medieval Augustinianism. Even his later attempts to cast epistemology in a more Aristotelian light retained the insistence that true knowledge somehow entails access to the exemplary essences in God’s mind. The same essentialism led Henry to formulate what he called an a priori proof for God’s existence, best approximation in the thirteenth century to Anselm’s ontological argument. Again, however, Henry’s Augustinianism provided an unintended springboard for innovation, leading to Duns Scotus’ theory of the univocity of being and metaphysical proof of God’s existence.

scholarly journals Die konstellasie taalbegrip-logika in die Middeleeuse filosofie (2): Duns Skotus tot De Rivo

2012 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johann Beukes
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
William Of Ockham ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Medieval Philosophy ◽  
Peter Abelard ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
Form Part ◽  
John Wyclif

The constellation language-logic in medieval philosophy (2): Duns Scotus to De Rivo. This second in a series of two articles continues the attempt to provide an in-depth overview of some of the most prominent – and some of the most underpublished - medieval thinkers’ stances on the constellation of language and logic, thus as a combined and condensed problem in western philosophy between the 5th and 15th centuries. The two articles form part of a rehabilitating series of modern-critical articles on understated and marginalised themes, texts and figures in medieval philosophy. The positions of the well-known philosophers that are covered in the two articles, St Augustine, Peter Abelard, St Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, are juxtaposed with some less familiar philosophical positions, amongst others those of Boethius, Peter of Spain, John Wyclif and Peter de Rivo.

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