The Mystery of Moral Perception
2016 ◽
Vol 13
(2)
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pp. 187-210
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Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
2018 ◽
Vol 15
(2)
◽
pp. 164-181
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2008 ◽
Vol 33
◽
pp. 271-278
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2001 ◽
Vol 63
(3)
◽
pp. 665-671
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