Phenomenal Explanationism’s Global Ambitions

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Multiple Domains ◽  
The Way

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.

Boghossian on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori Once Again1

2020 ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Learning Mathematics ◽  
The Way

This chapter replies to Boghossian’s Chapter 15 and amplifies the arguments of the author’s Chapter 14. In particular, it illustrates the loss of underived dispositions with an example from learning mathematics, when the novice gradually ceases to be tempted by a certain kind of mistake. It is also explains why the argument of Chapter 14 does not assume that introspection and postulation are mutually incompatible; rather, it notes the author’s inability to introspect the non-doxastic intellectual seemings Boghossian postulates and suggests that it is not idiosyncratic. Finally, a challenge is raised for Boghossian’s view of a priori justification as coherence with intellectual seemings. What prevents bigoted beliefs being justified a priori in the way he describes by the bigoted intellectual seemings of a consistent Nazi, for example? If nothing does, what prevents the Nazi’s so-justified beliefs as to what one ought to do from justifying the corresponding actions?

Analyticity Reconsidered1

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Metaphysical Notion ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.

scholarly journals Some Virtues of Evidentialism

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Feldman ◽  
Earl Conee
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Justification Knowledge

O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que é ótima para que se perceba o núcleo dos problemas. Oferece soluções, sem mascarar as dificuldades. Nós fornecemos ilustração disso através da consideração dos problemas da justificação a priori e do ceticismo. O evidencialismo também oferece a base para que se compreenda uma grande variedade de fatos e conceitos epistemológicos. Nós fornecemos ilustração disso, mostrando que o evidencialismo pode explicar como a justificação pode ser anulada, como as atitudes distintas da crença podem ser objeto de avaliação e como a própria prática da filosofia é epistemicamente valiosa. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Evidencialismo. Evidência. Justificação. Conhecimento. A priori. Ceticismo. ABSTRACT Evidentialism is primarily a thesis about epistemic justification and secondarily a thesis about knowledge. It holds that epistemic justification supervenes on evidence. Versions of evidentialism differ about what counts as evidence, what it is to have something as evidence, and what a particular body of evidence supports. The secondary thesis is that evidential support is necessary for knowledge. Evidentialism helps to frame epistemological issues in a way that is optimal for seeing the heart of the problems. It offers solutions without disguising the difficulties. We illustrate this by considering the problems of a priori justification and skepticism. Evidentialism also provides the basis for understanding a variety of epistemological facts and concepts. We illustrate this by showing that evidentialism can explain how justification can be defeated, how attitudes other than belief can be the object of evaluation, and how the practice of philosophy itself is epistemically valuable. KEY WORDS – Evidentialism. Evidence. Justification. Knowledge. A priori. Skepticism.

How Do We Know that We’re Not Brains in Vats?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith DeRose
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Conservative Approach ◽  
Contingent Fact ◽  
Brains In Vats ◽  
Priori Knowledge

In this chapter the contextualist Moorean account of how we know by ordinary standards that we are not brains in vats (BIVs) utilized in Chapter 1 is developed and defended, and the picture of knowledge and justification that emerges is explained. The account (a) is based on a double-safety picture of knowledge; (b) has it that our knowledge that we’re not BIVs is in an important way a priori; and (c) is knowledge that is easily obtained, without any need for fancy philosophical arguments to the effect that we’re not BIVs; and the account is one that (d) utilizes a conservative approach to epistemic justification. Special attention is devoted to defending the claim that we have a priori knowledge of the deeply contingent fact that we’re not BIVs, and to distinguishing this a prioritist account of this knowledge from the kind of “dogmatist” account prominently championed by James Pryor.

THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION

Ratio ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Horvath
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Modal Argument

Elaborations

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Suk-Young Chwe
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Practices ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Generation ◽  
The One ◽  
Influence Behavior ◽  
The Way

This chapter begins by describing two competing kinds of explanations to the one offered in the preceding chapter. The first is the way in which rituals are thought to influence behavior through direct psychological stimulation. The second is based on how being physically together in a group of people affects individual emotions. It addresses the question of whether common knowledge is an impossible ideal. It then discusses how publicity—or more precisely, common knowledge generation—and content are never really separable, in contrast to the book's argument that both must be considered in understanding cultural practices such as rituals. The chapter goes on to explain how historical precedent can generate common knowledge and generating community through common knowledge.

Touch—An A Priori Approach

2018 ◽  
pp. 37-60
Author(s):  
Aniket Jaaware
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Genre Classification ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter provides a diagram of touch. It is possible to posit a theory of genres of touch, based on the discussions in the preceding chapter. The primary categories of genre classification here are the following pairs of concepts: touching oneself/touching others; literal touch/figural touch; and good touch/bad touch. The chapter looks at the relationship between touching and being touched; it locates being touched as one kind of experience of otherness, and touching others as another kind of experience of otherness. Meanwhile, one gets to know literal touch in two ways: through sensation, and through the difference it makes when compared to figural touch. The chapter then determines what constitutes the good touch and the bad touch, touch that generates pain and touch that generates pleasure.

Courts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The preceding chapter considered the foundations of judicial review in the EU. The discussion now turns to the EU Courts. The way in which the principles of review have developed has been affected by the jurisdictional divide between the CJEU and GC, and between these Courts and national courts. It will be argued that a necessary condition for an effective regime of judicial control is the existence of a rational judicial architecture, embracing the CJEU, GC, national courts, and agency boards of appeal.

Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1

2020 ◽  
pp. 214-226
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Mental States ◽  
A Priori Justification

This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.

The Epistemology of Consent

2021 ◽  
pp. 348-386
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Guerrero
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
The Right ◽  
Affirmative Consent ◽  
The Way

Philosophers spend a lot of time discussing what consent is. In this chapter, Alexander Guerrero suggests that there are also hard and important epistemological questions about consent and that debates about consent often mistake epistemological issues for metaphysical ones. People who defend so-called “affirmative consent” views sometimes are accused of, or even take themselves to be, offering a new, controversial view about the nature of consent. Guerrero argues that this is a mistake. The right way of understanding “affirmative consent” is as a view about what is required, epistemically, before one can justifiably believe that another person has consented. This view will be justified, if it is, because of background views about epistemic justification and the way epistemic justification interacts with moral norms governing action. Guerrero concludes by discussing the implications of this view for the morality and law regarding consent.

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