scholarly journals Standing up for Democracy? Explaining Citizens’ Support for Democratic Checks and Balances

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110602
Author(s):  
Honorata Mazepus ◽  
Dimiter Toshkov

Winners and losers of elections have different stakes in protecting democratic institutions. We provide new evidence for the effects of partisanship and economic performance on support for checks and balances and acceptance of their infringement. Using survey data from 26 European countries, we show that voters who feel close to a political party that lost the elections support checks and balances significantly more than other citizens. We also find that higher satisfaction with the economy is associated with lower support for checks and balances. Our experiment in Ukraine shows that supporters and opponents of the governing party have divergent evaluations of a reform potentially infringing on the independence of the judiciary. Those in opposition find such reforms less acceptable and justified. Again, we find that improved economic performance leads to higher acceptance of judicial reform. Our results confirm that citizens’ support for checks and balances is contingent and volatile.

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. A343-A344 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.L. Able ◽  
V. Haynes ◽  
K. Annunziata ◽  
H. Upadhyaya ◽  
W. Deberdt

2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199642
Author(s):  
Ringa Raudla ◽  
James W. Douglas ◽  
Zachary Mohr

Civil servants vary in the degree to which they hold technocratic attitudes. We explore whether bureaucrats’ exposure to politics and politicians is associated with the depoliticization dimension of the technocratic mentality. We use survey data of high-level executives in 19 European countries to explore factors that are associated with executives’ perceptions that removing issues and activities from the realms of politics leads to more farsighted policies. We find that respondents’ level of exposure to politics and politicians is indeed negatively associated with technocratic mentality. Bureaucrats have studied political science or public administration, work closer to politicians (in terms of type of organization), interact with them more frequently, and have more positive perceptions of these interactions tend to have lower levels of technocratic attitudes. Points for practitioners Beliefs affect behaviors and behaviors affect outcomes. Technocratic attitudes may limit the ability of civil servants to work effectively with politicians. We show that educational degrees that promote democratic values and exposure to politicians (particularly positive interactions) are associated with lower levels of technocratic attitudes. Given that a proper balance between political and technical knowledge can enhance organizational performance (Krause et al., 2006), these findings should be taken into account when staffing and structuring public organizations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mayumi Nakamura

AbstractIn many countries, the size of a law firm is closely related to the specializations and incomes of the lawyers it employs, and can be considered an index for disparities among lawyers. Gender and school prestige may affect the size of the first firm that lawyers join. Moreover, since the lawyer population has quadrupled over the last 20 years in Japan, mainly due to judicial reform, I hypothesize that this population increase has changed how gender and school prestige affect the size of the first firm law school graduates decide to join. To test this, I conducted a secondary statistical analysis on the effect of gender and school prestige on the size of the first firm that lawyers joined, using survey data collected by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations in 2010. Findings suggest that there were no significant differences in the size of women’s and men’s first employer, but that school prestige was significant. Moreover, the importance of school prestige has increased over the years.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ora John Reuter ◽  
Jennifer Gandhi

Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that (1) rule with the aid of a dominant political party and (2) hold multi-party elections. Elite coalitions organized under the aegis of a hegemonic party are most vulnerable in elections that coincide with poor economic performance. A declining economy provides elites with a platform around which they can mobilize support to challenge incumbents in elections. As a result, the likelihood of defections from hegemonic parties increases as income declines. This study’s original dataset, which includes 227 elections for the chief executive in hegemonic party dictatorships from 1946 to 2004, and its case studies of defections in Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF in 2008 and Turkey under the Democratic Party in 1955 provide evidence for this proposition.


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