Conceptualizing talent in public sector municipalities

While talent management is considered a top priority among practitioners and constitutes a major research area, the actual meaning of talent still remains largely undefined. In response to a lack of clarity and empirical basis regarding the notion of talent, various calls have been made for exploring how organizations conceptualize talent, particularly in the public sector context. This article answers these calls by adopting a qualitative in-depth case study to explore how senior Human Resources (HR) managers in public sector municipalities conceptualize talent in practice. The findings illustrate how HR managers use a variety of conceptualizations of talent. We analyze and theorize this variation and the ways of conceptualizing talent using two conceptualization categories: non-contextual conceptualizations, which are general and related to official practices (i.e. talent as future leaders and talent as a general commitment and drive forward), and contextual conceptualizations, which are specific and related to informal assumptions (i.e. talent as Trojans and specialists, talent as individual agility, and talent as public service awareness). Points for practitioners Human Resources (HR) managers use a variety of conceptualizations of talent in practice. Two conceptualization categories – that is, “non-contextual” (general and related to official practices) and “contextual” (specific and related to informal assumptions) – help us understand this variation and the ways of conceptualizing talent. HR managers are only partly shaped by the particularities of the public sector context, and some of the talent philosophies held by HR managers do not align with the existing and official talent management practices.

Harmonising public sector accounting laws and regulations of the European Union member states: powers and competences

This paper analyses the powers and competences of the EU to standardise public sector accounting of the member states and to take other EU action in the field of public sector accounting. We argue that public sector accounting forms part of the administrative organisation of the member states that is not a core EU competence. EU initiatives such as the European Public Sector Accounting Standards project, which aim to increase transparency and comparability, therefore need to follow the rules set out for administrative matters in general. The study reveals on the one hand that EU actions are essentially limited to voluntary cooperation and influences of other policy areas. But on the other hand, it shows that they do not need to be limited to the initiatives currently driven by Eurostat. Points for practitioners The future of the European Public Sector Accounting Standards project is uncertain. However, it is very unlikely that it will take the shape of a top-down set of readymade EU accounting standards that will force public administrations to adjust their inner workings. Public sector accounting is not (yet) a (typical) European policy, but simply a national one that the EU can support. The EU initiative can be considered as an opportunity for collaboration and knowledge sharing on how to increase transparency of public sector accounting.

A meta-analysis of how the culture and technical development level influence citizens’ adoption of m-government

With the popularity of mobile Internet technology, mobile government has become the mainstream of current government affairs management, which highlights the growing importance of exploring citizens’ intention to adopt m-government. To find the important driving factors of m-government adoption and understand what roles the cultural and technical development level play in it, this study conducted a meta-analysis to search for important factors in m-government adoption from 42 studies from 17 countries. Based on the socio-technical theory, this study applied a meta-regression to explain the differences in the effects of these factors, from the perspective of culture and technical development level. The results show that perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, attitude, social influence, perceived compatibility and trust all play important roles in m-government adoption. Culture and technical development level play moderating roles on the above relationships except for the perceived ease of use–perceived usefulness path. Our findings also reveal that the joint moderating effect of cultural and technical development level can better explain the impact of environmental factors on m-government adoption and consequently provide suggestions for the future implementation of m-government in different countries with diverse cultures. Points for practitioners This study proposes a research model of m-government adoption. Public managers should focus on citizens’ perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, attitude, social influence, perceived compatibility and trust, so as to improve citizens’ intention to use. The results also confirm that culture and technical development level have a specific moderating effect on m-government adoption, which means that public managers should not only consider service quality, but also note environmental factors. They especially should consider the flexible mobile government development strategies in different countries.

Governance and tax revenue: does foreign aid matter?

This study seeks to explores the relationship among governance, foreign aid, and tax revenue. A common notion on governance is that it is a multifaceted factor, it may affect from other factor that is foreign aid. Foreign aid can hamper the governance situation and thus can reduce tax collection. To test these theoretical assumptions, we collected the numerical data from Asian economies for the years 2001–2019 and employed the panel FMOLS (fully modified ordinary least square) test to estimate the regression. The empirical findings first reveal that governance and foreign aid have a positive association with tax revenue in the long run. However, a negative trend in tax collection was observed following the interaction of foreign aid and governance. Foreign aid deteriorates the governance situation, which has a negative spillover impact on tax revenue. Our empirical analysis suggests that policy officials should focus on exercising governance and foreign aid effectiveness to meet the objective of more tax collection. Points for practitioners Policy officials should focus on better governance exercises. They should carefully decide on the volume of foreign aid receipts. However, if it becomes necessary to receive foreign aid, then they should focus on aid effectiveness. Such steps can benefit the practitioners to collect more tax.

Pre-contractual relational governance for public–private partnerships: how can ex-ante relational governance help formal contracting in smart city outsourcing projects?

In the literature on relational governance, it is often assumed that relational governance emerges primarily after formal contracting and acts as a functional supplement to a formal contract. In this article, we show that especially facing deep uncertainties, relational governance can emerge before the start of formal partnerships, in the form of trust-building, exchanging resources, and fostering flexibility. Based on a case study of a smart city outsourcing project, this article introduces a forward-extended framework of relational governance that captures the pre-contractual dimensions of relationship cultivation and their role in facilitating formal contracting. The study finds that pre-contractual relational governance facilitates formal contracting by reducing substantive, evaluative, technological, and procedural uncertainties in the project and helps the partners to design an elaborative contract, undergo an easy negotiation, adopt short-term contracts, and use simple monitoring and evaluation methods. The article thus argues that only understanding post-contractual relational governance is insufficient for exploring the relation between formal contracting and relational governance; facing deep uncertainties, it is necessary to understand how public and private parties develop their pre-contractual relationship and reduce the uncertainties before a formal contract can be signed. Points for practitioners Practitioners should realize that there is much room for relational governance in the pre-contractual phase of PPP projects when the projects are rife with various uncertainties. Public and private parties can take measures to build trust, foster flexibility, and create interdependence before a formal contract is signed. These ex-ante relational governance measures can facilitate formal contracting by reducing the various uncertainties, making a formal contract designable, making negotiation smooth and easy, and reducing the need for contract supervision.

The top-heavy shape of authoritarian bureaucracy: evidence from Russia and China

The prevalence of top-heavy bureaucracies in non-democracies cannot be explained by the theories of Parkinson, Tullock, Niskanen, or Simon or by classical managerial theories. When bureaucracy positions carry rents, the competition for promotion becomes a rent-seeking process. Borrowing the career-tournament theory framework from managerial scholarship, we argue that top-heavy bureaucracy resembles a tournament with too many finalists. When rent is centralized at the top (i.e. power centralization), as is the case in many non-democracies, the optimal bureaucracy should be top-heavy, accommodating and encouraging relatively more finalists at the top to compete for the final big prize. We provide suggestive evidence by analyzing ministry organizations in China (1993–2014) and Russia (2002–2015). After some fluctuations, the shape of Russian ministries eventually converged with that of China. In the steady state, their ministry shapes are far more top-heavy than what is prescribed by managerial theories. At the micro-level, ministry power centralization, measured by the perceived influence of the ministers, is correlated with ministry top-heaviness in Russia. Points for practitioners Our theory suggests that a top-heavy authoritarian bureaucratic structure naturally follows from a back-loaded sequential career tournament and an effort-maximizing bureaucratic leader. Our findings also suggest that Chinese and Russian ministries both converge to a highly top-heavy structure in the long run. We demonstrate that the top-heavy structure first arose during the planned-economy experiment in the Soviet Union. Our research sheds new light on public-sector reforms that aim to reduce bureaucracy top-heaviness in autocracies.

A transformative change through a coordination process and a steering agency. The case of the financial information system of the French central state

Recent scholarship has focused on how coordination mechanisms are implemented by public sector organizations, thereby paying attention to coordination as a process. This article studies the coordination process that resulted in the implementation of the interministerial financial information system of the French central state—named Chorus. Chorus is a case of an unlikely coordination process rolled out in the non-conducive context of the French Napoleonic Administration. Chorus aimed at connecting all ministries’ administrative services to a shared information system, while ministries were previously using their own systems and applications. Based on the literature on mechanisms of coordination, and focusing on the role of existing institutions and the actors involved in the coordination process, the analysis has two main results. First, AIFE—“Agence pour l’informatique financière de l’État”, the agency in charge of the implementation of Chorus—steered the process by developing a stepwise network-based interministerial strategy. Second, the coordination steered by AIFE resulted in a transformative change of the French state's financial and accounting structures through a layering process of change. Thereby, the article contributes to the empirical analysis of public administrations’ recent changes toward increased coordination at the central level by studying recent reforms in France and their outcomes. Points for practitioners This article shows that coordination processes within public sector organizations are context sensitive and depend on the behavior of the “agents of change” in charge of these processes. In contexts that are non-conducive to transformative change (e.g. siloed structures, presence of veto players), the set-up of agile, resourceful and autonomous change agents is key. When veto players may oppose structural change, the article suggests setting up network-based coordination processes aiming at incremental evolutions inducing transformative change.

Public service-oriented work motives across Europe: A cross-country, multi-level investigation

This article disentangles the country-specific institutional system at the macro level from individual-level attraction and socialization in measuring public service-oriented work motives across European countries through public–private sector comparisons. We argue that country-specific institutions shape the level of public service-oriented work motives of each country and thereby generate level differences across countries. In contrast, public–private sector differences, (i.e. gaps), in public service-oriented work motives within a country reflect aspects of individual-level attraction and socialization. We use the 2005 and 2010 waves of the European Working Conditions Survey and demonstrate that the levels and gaps are empirically distinct phenomena, contrary to current treatment in the literature. We conclude that the distinction between levels and gaps can advance understanding of the antecedents of public service-oriented work motives and support the institutional theory of public service-oriented work motives. Points for practitioners This article argues and provides evidence for the fact that levels of work motives oriented towards public service that are visible in a cross-country comparison should not be confused with the gap of such work motives inside one country. This distinction is important because in countries where gaps between the sectors are almost non-existent and levels are generally high, interventions geared towards public service-oriented work motives are less likely to be effective.

Exploring performance paradox in public organizations: Analyzing the predictors of distortive behaviors in performance measurement

Scholars have argued that utilization of quantitative performance indicators by public organizations could generate unintended consequences that might outweigh the benefits of performance measurement. We examined the relationships between goal ambiguity and external control, and distortive practices in performance measurement in public organizations. The data from 47 agencies of the central and local governments in Korea were analyzed using fixed-effect ordered logistic regression methods. The results showed that goal ambiguity was positively and significantly associated with distortive practices in performance measurement. Goal ambiguity may incentivize public employees to misuse performance information to obtain rewards for higher performance ratings. Contrary to our expectation, reinforced external control was negatively and significantly related to distortive behaviors in performance measurement. Higher work autonomy was not significantly associated with manipulation of performance information. Employees with higher intrinsic motivation were less likely to distort performance measures, whereas the ones with higher extrinsic motivation were more likely to misuse performance information to achieve higher performance ratings. Points for practitioners To avoid the potential distortions in performance measurement, public managers should adopt a refined measurement model of performance customized to the unique characteristics of public services. Multiple sets of measures need to be developed and managed properly to respond to complex political environments which involve different key values and the stakeholders in the policy processes, and the nature of public service products and outcomes. Reinforced behavioral control in the process of measuring performance will also be necessary.