The Mere Exposure Effect: An Uncertainty Reduction Explanation Revisited

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (10) ◽  
pp. 1255-1266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Y. Lee
Author(s):  
Mikael Molet ◽  
Paul Craddock ◽  
Alana J. Osroff ◽  
Patty Li ◽  
Tessa L. Livingston ◽  
...  

Abstract. The mere exposure effect (MEE) is defined as repeated exposures to a stimulus enhancing affective evaluations of that stimulus ( Zajonc, 1968 ). The three prominent explanations of the MEE are Zajonc's “neophobia” account, the uncertainty reduction account, and the perceptual fluency approach. Zajonc's “neophobia” account posits that people have an inherent low level of fear of novel objects and exposure to the objects partially extinguishes this novelty-based fear. The uncertainty reduction account asserts that people find uncertainty aversive and habituation reduces uncertainty. The fluency account postulates that people “like” representations of things with which they are fluent. In four experiments, we induced positive and negative moods before or after target exposures. In addition to assessing the MEE in each condition, we assessed the mood induction. The central hypothesis assessed in this series was that there would be an interaction between mood and the MEE. Although the three accounts of the MEE generated divergent predictions, none of the accounts were well supported by the data. Tests for mood induction demonstrated the efficacy of the induction procedures and the MEE was consistently observed, but Bayesian analysis indicated that at least in the present preparation mood had no effect on the MEE.


2005 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brent M. Robinson ◽  
Lorin J. Elias

Repeated exposure of a nonreinforced stimulus results in an increased preference for that stimulus, the mere exposure effect. The present study repeatedly presented positive, negative, and neutrally affective faces to 48 participants while they made judgments about the emotional expression. Participants then rated the likeability of novel neutrally expressive faces and some of these previously presented faces, this time in their neutral expression. Faces originally presented as happy were rated as the most likeable, followed by faces originally presented as neutral. Negative and novel faces were not rated significantly differently from each other. These findings support the notion that the increase in preference towards repeatedly presented stimuli is the result of the reduction in negative affect, consistent with the modified two-factor uncertainty-reduction model and classical conditioning model of the mere exposure effect.


Author(s):  
Sylvie Willems ◽  
Jonathan Dedonder ◽  
Martial Van der Linden

In line with Whittlesea and Price (2001) , we investigated whether the memory effect measured with an implicit memory paradigm (mere exposure effect) and an explicit recognition task depended on perceptual processing strategies, regardless of whether the task required intentional retrieval. We found that manipulation intended to prompt functional implicit-explicit dissociation no longer had a differential effect when we induced similar perceptual strategies in both tasks. Indeed, the results showed that prompting a nonanalytic strategy ensured performance above chance on both tasks. Conversely, inducing an analytic strategy drastically decreased both explicit and implicit performance. Furthermore, we noted that the nonanalytic strategy involved less extensive gaze scanning than the analytic strategy and that memory effects under this processing strategy were largely independent of gaze movement.


Leonardo ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bence Nanay

It has been argued that some recent experimental findings about the mere exposure effect can be used to argue for aesthetic antirealism: the view that there is no fact of the matter about aesthetic value. The aim of this article is to assess this argument and point out that this strategy, as it stands, does not work. But we may still be able to use experimental findings about the mere exposure effect in order to engage with the aesthetic realism/antirealism debate. However, this argument would need to proceed very differently and would only support a much more modest version of aesthetic antirealism.


2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Weeks ◽  
Justin G. Longenecker ◽  
Joseph A. McKinney ◽  
Carlos W. Moore

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