Dimensionless Invariants for Intentional Systems: Measuring the Fit of Vehicular Activities to Environmental Layout

Author(s):  
Robert E. Shaw ◽  
Oded M. Flascher ◽  
Endre E. Kadar
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-72
Author(s):  
Lauren Olin

Abstract Despite sustained philosophical attention, no theory of humor claims general acceptance. Drawing on the resources provided by intentional systems theory, this article first outlines an approach to investigating humor based on the idea of a comic stance, then sketches the Dismissal Theory of Humor (DTH) that has resulted from pursuing that approach. According to the DTH, humor manifests in cases where the future-directed significance of anticipatory failures is dismissed. Mirth, on this view, is the reward people get for declining to update predictive representational schemata in ways that maximize their futureoriented value. The theory aims to provide a plausible account of the role of humor in human mental and social life, but it also aims to be empirically vulnerable, and to generate testable predictions about how the comic stance may actually be undergirded by cognitive architectures.


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 83-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Carey ◽  
Bruce R. Lippke ◽  
John Sessions

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Wanja Wiese ◽  
J. Allan Hobson

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness.


2006 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 851-863 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hernán A. Burbano

This paper posits that the gene-centered viewpoint of the organism (gene-centrism) is not enough to explain biological complexity. Organisms are not completely determined by their genomes; rather, living beings can be seen as interpreters or intentional systems. Epigenetics is the framework that allows the avoidance of gene-centrism and permits the emergence of a more holistic standpoint where determination and novelty can coexist, as shown with examples taken from developmental biology and macromolecules folding. In summary, as P. Medawar and J. Medawar wrote: "Genetics proposes; epigenetics disposes."


1983 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Dennett

AbstractEthologists and others studying animal behavior in a “cognitive” spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular “information-processing models.” Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable “anecdotal” data - is sketched. The underlying assumptions of this approach can be seen to ally it directly with “adaptationist” theorizing in evolutionary biology, which has recently come under attack from Stephen Gould and Richard Lewontin, who castigate it as the “Panglossian paradigm.” Their arguments, which are strongly analogous to B. F, Skinner's arguments against “mentalism,” point to certain pitfalls that attend the careless exercise of such “Panglossian” thinking (and rival varieties of thinking as well), but do not constitute a fundamental objection to either adaptationist theorizing or its cousin, intentional system theory.


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