The minimally conscious state: Definition and diagnostic criteria

Neurology ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 506-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Coleman ◽  
D. A. Shewmon ◽  
J.T. Giacino
Neurology ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.T. Giacino ◽  
S. Ashwal ◽  
N. Childs ◽  
R. Cranford ◽  
B. Jennett ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Golden ◽  
Kimberly S Erler ◽  
John Wong ◽  
Joseph T Giacino ◽  
Yelena G Bodien

Objective: To determine whether consistent command-following (CCF) should be added to the diagnostic criteria for emergence from the minimally conscious state (MCS) Design: Retrospective cohort study Setting: Inpatient rehabilitation hospital Participants: Patients with severe acquired brain injury and disorders of consciousness (DoC) admitted to a specialized rehabilitation program Main Outcome Measure: Difference between time to recovery of CCF and time to recovery of functional object use [FOU] or functional communication [FC] (the two existing criteria for emergence from MCS) as measured by the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised [CRS-R]). Results: Of 214 patients (median [interquartile range] age: 53 [34, 66] years, male: 134 (62.6%), traumatic etiology: 115 (53.7%), admission CRS-R total score: 10 [7, 13]) admitted to rehabilitation without CCF, FO, or FC, 162 (75.7%) recovered CCF and FOU or FC during the eight-week observation period. On average, recovery of CCF, FOU, and FC was observed within one day of one another, approximately 46 [38.25, 58] days post-injury. One hundred and sixteen patients (71.6%) recovered FOU or FC prior to or at the same time as CCF. Conclusions: In patients recovering from DoC, CCF reemerges around the same time as FOU and FC. This finding likely reflects the shared dependency of these behaviors on cognitive procecess (e.g., language comprehension, attention, motor control) that are essential for effective interpersonal interaction and social participation. Our results support the addition of CCF to the existing diagnostic criteria for emergence from MCS.


2019 ◽  
Vol 267 (5) ◽  
pp. 1245-1254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurore Thibaut ◽  
Yelena G. Bodien ◽  
Steven Laureys ◽  
Joseph T. Giacino

2020 ◽  
Vol 267 (5) ◽  
pp. 1255-1259
Author(s):  
Aurore Thibaut ◽  
Yelena G. Bodien ◽  
Steven Laureys ◽  
Joseph T. Giacino

Neurology ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 59 (9) ◽  
pp. 1473-1474 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Burke ◽  
J. J. Fins ◽  
N. D. Schiff ◽  
C. Machado ◽  
J.I. Giacino ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Joshua Shepherd

This chapter argues for a normative distinction between disabilities that are inherently negative with respect to well-being and disabilities that are inherently neutral. After clarifying terms, the author discusses recent arguments according to which possession of a disability is inherently neutral with respect to well-being. He notes that although these arguments are compelling, they are only intended to cover certain disabilities and, in fact, that there exists a broad class regarding which they do not apply. He then discusses two problem cases: locked-in syndrome and the minimally conscious state, and explains why these are cases in which possession of these disabilities makes one worse off overall. He argues that disabilities that significantly impair control over one’s situation tend to be inherently negative with respect to well-being; other disabilities do not. The upshot is that we must draw an important normative distinction between disabilities that undermine this kind of control and disabilities that do not.


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