Supply Chain Coordination with Inventory Level Dependent Demand and Inventory Risk Averse Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 80-92
Author(s):  
玉金 钟
2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minli Xu ◽  
Qiao Wang ◽  
Linhan Ouyang

When the demand is sensitive to retail price, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract have been shown to be able to coordinate supply chains with risk neutral agents. We extend the previous studies to consider a risk-averse retailer in a two-echelon fashion supply chain. Based on the classic mean-variance approach in finance, the issue of channel coordination in a fashion supply chain with risk-averse retailer and price-dependent demand is investigated. We propose both single contracts and joint contracts to achieve supply chain coordination. We find that the coordinating revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract in the supply chain with risk neutral agents are still useful to coordinate the supply chain taking into account the degree of risk aversion of fashion retailer, whereas a more complex sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract fails to do so. When using combined contracts to coordinate the supply chain, we demonstrate that only revenue sharing with two-part tariff contract can coordinate the fashion supply chain. The optimal conditions for contract parameters to achieve channel coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to supplement the results and more insights are gained.


Author(s):  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang

In order to investigate supply chain coordination and decision under customer balking and stochastic demand, the article considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with risk-neutral and one retailer with risk-neutral and develops two models in a centralized and a decentralized system and the three contracts are designed to coordinate supply chain and the optimal price and customer balking strategies are obtained. The results show that the revenue and cost-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain under customer balking and price-dependent demand and achieve the Pareto-improvement; the expected sales quantity and expected reduced sales quantity are influenced conversely by the threshold of inventory and probability of a sale under customer balking. In addition, numerical analysis is given to verify the effectiveness of revenue and cost-sharing contract and the paper gives some managerial insights and puts forward to the future work at last.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Yuer Chen ◽  
Yulu Hu

Considering the market demand is stochastic and dependent on price, this paper shows that the revenue-sharing contract could coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer under normal environment. However, the original revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain under disruptions in circumstances of certain incidents leading to significant changes in market demand and causing additional deviation costs. To solve the problem, this essay introduces two improved forms of revenue-sharing contract: a mixed contract form based on a quantity discount policy and a pure form, which are characterized by antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form or in the multiplicative form with price dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples.


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