Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

Benefits and Cost of a $35 Insulin Cost-Sharing Cap for Medicare Patients

BACKGROUND: To improve insulin affordability, Congress is considering capping insulin cost-sharing to $35 per 30-day supply for Medicare patients. The potential benefits and cost of this cap are unclear. Additionally, it is unknown whether the benefits of this cap would vary between Medicare patients with type 1 versus type 2 diabetes. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the IQVIA Longitudinal Prescription Database, which reports prescriptions dispensed from 92% of U.S. pharmacies, and the Optum Clinformatics Data Mart, a national claims database from Medicare Advantage patients. The IQVIA analysis included patients who only had dispensed insulin prescriptions paid by Medicare in 2019. We estimated the proportion of Medicare patients who would benefit from an insulin cost-sharing cap of $35 per 30-day supply. Among these patients, we calculated the mean annual decrease in insulin out-of-pocket spending. We summed this decrease across patients to estimate the cap's cost to the federal government. The Optum analysis included Medicare Advantage patients with diabetes and at least 1 dispensed insulin prescription in 2019. We used linear regression to compare the proportion of patients who would benefit from a $35 cap and annual savings among these patients by diabetes type, adjusting for demographic characteristics and payer type. RESULTS: The IQVIA analysis included 2,227,229 patients who only had dispensed insulin prescriptions paid by Medicare in 2019. Mean (SD) age was 69.2 (11.4) years. The $35 cap would benefit 887,051 (39.0%) of patients, lowering annual insulin out-of-pocket spending by $338, from $687 to $349. Across all patients in the sample, aggregate savings (i.e., the cap's cost to the federal government) would be $299,402,402, or a mean of $134.4 per patient. Among the 60,300 Medicare Advantage patients in the Optum Analysis, mean age was 72.6 (9.3) years; 2,686 (4.5%) had type 1 diabetes and 57,614 (95.6%) had type 2 diabetes. The $35 cap would benefit a higher proportion of patients with type 1 diabetes (64.0%) compared with patients with type 2 diabetes (59.4%). Among patients with type 1 diabetes who would benefit from the cap, annual savings would be greater ($284) compared with their counterparts with type 2 diabetes ($231; p<.001 in adjusted analyses for all comparisons). CONCLUSIONS: A $35 insulin cost-sharing cap would benefit a sizable proportion of Medicare patients using insulin and may particularly lower out-of-pocket spending for patients with type 1 diabetes. The estimated cost of this cap to the federal government would be $134.4 per Medicare patient using insulin.

Decision and coordination of an O2O supply chain with market segmentation and showrooming effect

This paper investigates impacts of market segmentation and showrooming effect on the decision-making of an O2O supply chain, and puts forwards a contract to coordinate the O2O supply chain. Results show that, the showrooming effect is beneficial to the manufacturer, retailer and the supply chain, and the retailer will offer offline showrooming service. Under the influence of market segmentation, O2O supply chain is not necessarily better than single-channel supply chain structure. But adopting advertising and other means to improve consumers’ online channel acceptance, it can realize transformation from single-channel to O2O structure. The benefits of showrooming effect can eliminate the disadvantage of market segmentation. Moreover, a service cost sharing contract is put forward, which can perfectly coordinate the O2O supply chain with market segmentation and showrooming effect. These findings help managers to understand which channel structure is optimal by considering market segmentation and showrooming effect and identify possible pathways for them to perfectly cooperation.

Low carbon joint strategy and coordination for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the paper, fairness concern criterion is utilized to explore the coordination of a dyadic supply chain with a fairness-concerned retailer (acting as a newsvendor), who is committed to low carbon efforts. Two models are developed for stochastic demand disturbances in the forms of multiplicative case and additive case, respectively. Firstly, the optimal joint decision of the retailer and the supply chain are proposed in two scenarios, i.e., decentralized decision and the centralized decision. Secondly, in order to realize channel coordination, the contract of revenue sharing combined with the mechanism of low-carbon cost sharing is designed. Moreover, the influences of the retailer's fairness concern and bargaining power on the joint decision and the contract parameters are also investigated. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and some suggestions to supply chain management are also provided. The results show that the revenue sharing contract can make the supply chain achieved coordination with the cost sharing mechanism of low-carbon efforts. Furthermore, the optimal low-carbon effort level and ordering quantity decrease in terms of fairness-concerned parameter and Nash bargaining power parameter, which increases in unit cost. However, the optimal pricing makes the opposite change.</p>

The Orchestrating Role of Carbon Subsidies in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

In this paper, we investigate the role of carbon subsidies in a capital-constrained supply chain. We analyze two green technology investment structures in such supply chains: one where the manufacturer determines the optimal carbon emission abatement level (MI-structure) and one where the retailer determines the optimal carbon emission abatement level (RI-structure). As the leader (the powerful participant or the first mover in a supply chain), the manufacturer may choose the investment structure that is most favorable to them. Our major findings are as follows: (1) carbon subsidies can improve the performance of a centralized green supply chain; (2) there exists a threshold value of carbon subsidy that determines the manufacturer’s choice of the best carbon emission abatement investment structure, but the retailer always benefits from RI-structure; and (3) the traditional cost-sharing contract fails to achieve green supply chain coordination. However, as an orchestrator, the carbon subsidy plays a crucial role in achieving quantity coordination when implemented alongside traditional cost-sharing contracts. Furthermore, using a parameter of side-payment, we propose a new contract design that facilitates win-win coordination.

The Cost Efficiency of Home Modifications to Reduce Health Care Costs

The existing quantity of housing dedicated for older adults is not sufficient to meet the needs of this growing population. And even as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services reimbursement structures are shifting from traditional inpatient and outpatient settings to care in the home, it is a commonplace that most homes were not designed or built to support the needs of aging residents or the provision of healthcare. It is time for America’s 100 million existing houses to be made as safe and accessible as possible for aging in place. Falls cost over $50 billion a year in medical expenses. This paper distills current knowledge regarding healthcare cost reductions from home modifications, and then calculates the cost efficiency to society and to the federal government of providing government subsidies for home modifications for older adults at the ages of 50, 65 and 75. Cost sharing among insurers, government and the beneficiary is one way to achieve the positive social returns.