Penerapan bagi hasil pembiayaan musyarakah pada bank pembiayaan syariah

This study aims to determine how the application of revenue sharing for musyarakah financing at BPRS XXX and whether the application of revenue sharing revenue for musyarakah in BPRS is in accordance with DSN Fatwa No. 08/DSN-MUI/IV/2000. This study uses a qualitative descriptive approach with the Grounded Research method. Data collection was carried out by interviewing several related parties in the BPRS, namely the Head of Marketing, Legal Officer, Sharia Supervisory Board, and musyarakah financing customers. The results of his research on the application of revenue sharing for musyarakah financing at BPRS have been carried out in accordance with DSN Fatwa No. 08/DSN-MUI/IV/2000. All provisions regarding musyarakah financing in the DSN Fatwa have been implemented by the BPRS, such as the ijab qabul, the subject of the contract, the object of the contract consisting of capital, work and profits, as well as operational and dispute costs. It's just that the distribution of losses applied by the BPRS is not in accordance with the fatwa, where the BPRS applies losses fully borne by the customer, not in accordance with the provisions of the Fatwa DSN which says that losses are jointly borne in accordance with their respective portion of capital.

Design Crowdsourcing Supply Chain in Short Life Cycle Products

Design crowdsourcing is the largest open innovation model that can create value with potential consumers. It offers an opportunity to quickly respond to the market by obtaining instant designs from the crowd, freelancing designers with fundamental skills. In addition, it can secure globally innovative competitiveness without financial burden, which is more effective to start-up companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the field of seasonal product industry. Developing standardized design crowdsourcing supply chain processes and mathematical models is essential to respond to market trends and customer needs in the seasonal product industry. This study has been carried out to determine the best mechanism in the design crowdsourcing supply chain and coordinate each supply chain member whose desires meet each other. Thus, we identify contracts under which conditions can coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain by a newsvendor model with a manufacturer and a retailer with a crowdsourcing platform. To see that, we study the coordination of the crowdsourcing supply chain through the following contracts: wholesale price, buy-back, and revenue sharing contract. For the forecasting, we present a framework of the design crowdsourcing supply chain and compare supply chain performance under crowdsourcing supply chain coordination. The summarized result shows that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain efficiently. In contrast, buy-back and revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain.

Low carbon joint strategy and coordination for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the paper, fairness concern criterion is utilized to explore the coordination of a dyadic supply chain with a fairness-concerned retailer (acting as a newsvendor), who is committed to low carbon efforts. Two models are developed for stochastic demand disturbances in the forms of multiplicative case and additive case, respectively. Firstly, the optimal joint decision of the retailer and the supply chain are proposed in two scenarios, i.e., decentralized decision and the centralized decision. Secondly, in order to realize channel coordination, the contract of revenue sharing combined with the mechanism of low-carbon cost sharing is designed. Moreover, the influences of the retailer's fairness concern and bargaining power on the joint decision and the contract parameters are also investigated. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and some suggestions to supply chain management are also provided. The results show that the revenue sharing contract can make the supply chain achieved coordination with the cost sharing mechanism of low-carbon efforts. Furthermore, the optimal low-carbon effort level and ordering quantity decrease in terms of fairness-concerned parameter and Nash bargaining power parameter, which increases in unit cost. However, the optimal pricing makes the opposite change.</p>

Dual-Channel Supply Chain Coordination With BOPS and a Revenue-Sharing Contract

The omni-channel strategies buy-online-pickup-in-store (BOPS) is used to cater to customers who want a consistent service experience in different channels. In this paper, the author thinks of BOPS as an effective strategy for encouraging some online customers to switch to offline stores with high online return losses. The author first studies an omni-channel supply chain with centralized and decentralized decision making and explains why online returns hurt the supply chain with respect to the matching rate and the unit return loss. Although different channels can be operated by the same firm or different firms, the author studies how to coordinate the entire chain using a revenue-sharing contract. When online return losses are high, it is effective to adopt BOPS to reduce online return losses; otherwise there is no need to do so. Finally, the author presents numerical experiments, including a special case, and shows that in many cases, using an appropriate revenue-sharing contract under the proposed mechanism can increase the profits of the entire supply chain and its members.

CAPACITY SHARING STRATEGY WITH SUSTAINABLE REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACTS

This paper develops a duopoly model to analyse capacity sharing strategy and the optimal revenue-sharing contract under a two-part tariff and examines the effects of capacity sharing, cost, and sharing charges in three scenarios. The paper uses the two-part tariff method and adds a more realistic assumption of incremental marginal costs to improve the research on capacity sharing strategies. The results show that capacity constraints affect the sustainable development of firms. A sustainable revenue-sharing contract can create a win-win situation for both firms and promote capacity sharing. Capacity sharing, cost, and the revenue-sharing rate have different impacts in different scenarios; the optimal revenue-sharing rate and fixed fee can be determined to maximise the profits of firms that share capacity. However, capacity sharing may not improve social welfare.

Player Mobility and Competitive Balance Regulation in Professional Sports Leagues

Competitive balance regulation is more widespread in North American than in Europan sports leagues. The present paper addresses the question whether this observation can be explained with the help of differences in the degree of player mobility. Using an extended version of the workhorse contest model of sports leagues, the paper shows that the answer depends on the kind of competitive balance regulation. While player mobility may help to explain the difference with respect to salary regulation (e.g., salary caps), the choice of revenue sharing schemes turns out to be independent of player mobility.