Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games
2020 ◽
Vol 45
(3)
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pp. 889-895
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Keyword(s):
We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of normal-form correlation.
2001 ◽
Vol 54
(2)
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pp. 291-301
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Keyword(s):
2016 ◽
Vol 34
(5)
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pp. 835-851
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Keyword(s):
2015 ◽
Vol 2
(1)
◽
pp. 103-115
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1981 ◽
Vol 6
(3)
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pp. 379-386
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