Dynamic Games and Applications
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Published By Springer-Verlag

2153-0793, 2153-0785

Johannes M. Schumacher ◽  
Puduru Viswanadha Reddy ◽  
Jacob C. Engwerda

Tian-Jiao Feng ◽  
Jie Mei ◽  
Rui-Wu Wang ◽  
Sabin Lessard ◽  
Yi Tao ◽  

Alexander Aurell ◽  
René Carmona ◽  
Gökçe Dayanıklı ◽  
Mathieu Laurière

AbstractWe consider a game for a continuum of non-identical players evolving on a finite state space. Their heterogeneous interactions are represented with a graphon, which can be viewed as the limit of a dense random graph. A player’s transition rates between the states depend on their control and the strength of interaction with the other players. We develop a rigorous mathematical framework for the game and analyze Nash equilibria. We provide a sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium and prove existence of solutions to a continuum of fully coupled forward-backward ordinary differential equations characterizing Nash equilibria. Moreover, we propose a numerical approach based on machine learning methods and we present experimental results on different applications to compartmental models in epidemiology.

Herbert Dawid ◽  
Serhat Gezer

AbstractWe study Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of two-player multi-mode differential games with controlled state dynamics, where one player controls the transition between modes. Different types of MPE are characterized distinguishing between delay equilibria, inducing for some initial conditions mode switches after a positive finite delay, and now or never equilibria, under which, depending on the initial condition, a mode switch occurs immediately or never. These results are applied to analyze the MPE of a game capturing the dynamic interaction between two incumbent firms among which one has to decide when to extend its product range by introducing a new product. The market appeal of the new product can be influenced over time by both firms through costly investments. Under a wide range of market introduction costs a now or never equilibrium coexists with a continuum of delay equilibria, each of them inducing a different time of product introduction.

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