scholarly journals Evil as Privation in Neoplatonism. Simplicius and Philoponus in Defense of Matter

2017 ◽  
pp. 391-408
Author(s):  
R. Loredana Cardullo

The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. 

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 391-408
Author(s):  
R. Loredana Cardullo

The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism.


Author(s):  
David P. Barshinger

This chapter describes Jonathan Edwards’s doctrine of sin and evil. It emphasizes the role of the Bible as foundational to his theology while also highlighting his desire to defend the reasonableness of traditional Christian doctrine in light of eighteenth-century intellectual challenges. The chapter explores Edwards’s theodicy in response to the problem of evil—how he sought to absolve God of the charge that he is the author of evil. It describes Edwards’s doctrine of original sin and human depravity, which he explained by defending the universality of sin and the transmission of Adam’s sin to his posterity and in which he developed an innovative metaphysic using occasionalism and continuous creationism. As a pastor, Edwards preached on sin to warn people of punishment, call them to repentance, and emphasize redemption in Christ. The chapter recommends giving greater attention to Edwards’s sermons and pastoral ministry in understanding his view of sin and evil.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 862
Author(s):  
Elisa Freschi

Several scholars have discussed various versions of the theory of karman as offering a convincing solution to the problem of evil. Arthur Herman even thinks that the theory of karman is the ultimate theodicy (1976). Such scholars tend to imagine that a unitary theory of karman can be reconstructed as the backbone of most of Sanskrit philosophy of religion and ethics. In this article, I discuss the role of the theory of karman and the problem of evil in one of the schools of Sanskrit philosophy which is still alive and thriving, namely Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. Is karman really the central key to theodicy in this school? Additionally, does the school’s theory of karman correspond to what Herman, Chadha, Trakakis, Sharma and others discuss?


1981 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Frankenberry

What good is divinity if it can come only in dreams and shadows…? (Wallace Stevens)It is a well-known and rarely challenged assumption that one of the chief merits of Whitehead's cosmology is that it enables religious thinkers to come at the problem of God in relation to the presence of evil in an entirely new way. Among the virtues most commonly appealed to in praise of the Whiteheadian theodicy are its emphasis on God's persuasive, rather than controlling power; its defence of the moral goodness of the God whose nature is reconceived in the light of the problem of evil; and its provision for a realistic hope in the redemptive processes operative in divine and human history. However, none of these aspects of process theodicy is without serious problems. In what follows I will present certain reasons why I do not believe process theism has made good its claim to have solved, with the help of Whitehead's philosophy, the problem of evil. Rather, I will suggest that like the story of what happened to the donkey laden with salt, who took to the water, process theology's ‘solution’ to the problem of evil dissolves in the dialectic river of life, until nothing is left but the verbal sack in which it is contained. Much of the force of this critique will hinge on recognizing the systematic implications of the role of ambiguity in a processive-relational universe, a position I will summarize in conclusion.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Welz

This article explores imagination as a means of ethical re-orientation in the aftermath of atrocity. The discussion of the problem of evil is based on Hannah Arendt’s critique of Kant and her notion of ‘rootless’ rather than ‘radical’ evil. On this basis, the orienting potential of visual images is investi­gated with regard to images of violence in the media on the one hand, and, on the other, with regard to Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam. Then the role of verbal and mental images of humanity or inhumanity is discussed with reference to the Holocaust survivor Jorge Semprun’s testimony in his book Literature or Life. Finally, the biblical motif of the human being created in the image of an invisible God, the imago Dei, comes into view as an exemplary image of humanity that appears in a framework of interpretation where the invisible is mediated with the help of verbal, visual and/or mental images.


2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-377
Author(s):  
TOBY BETENSON

AbstractThe problem of evil contains some evaluative claims. Recognizing the fundamental role of the evaluative claims within the problem of evil presents two significant problems for the argument from evil. First, in order for the argument from evil to be successful, the normative assumptions that underlie the evaluative claims within the problem of evil must be deployed consistently both within the problem and between those who are discussing the problem. This level of normative agreement is likely to be difficult to achieve. Second, the argument from evil moves from evaluative premises to a non-evaluative conclusion, and thus commits the same error that J. L. Mackie identifies the moral argument for the existence of God as committing: it gets the direction of supervenience between facts and values back-to-front. Mackie's criticisms of the moral argumentforthe existence of God ought to also apply to the moral argumentagainstthe existence of God. If my analysis is correct, and Mackie's point is valid, then the argument from evil will be left fatally undermined. The problem of evil cannot be used to argue for the conclusion that ‘God does not exist’.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.


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