Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers
Keyword(s):
Abstract We propose a timing game of asymmetric tax competition with fiscal equalization scheme. The study finds that governments tend to play a sequential-move game as the scale of equalization transfer increases, which explains the emergence of tax leaders in tax competition. The presence of a tax leader is likely to exacerbate capital misallocation among countries, suggesting that equalization transfers aimed at narrowing the interregional fiscal gap might cause an inefficient capital allocation.
2013 ◽
Vol 21
(6)
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pp. 1012-1027
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2017 ◽
Vol 132
(4)
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pp. 1915-1967
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2017 ◽
Vol 25
(2)
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pp. 311-324
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2016 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 1-10
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2007 ◽
Vol 9
(5)
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pp. 901-925
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