G. E. MOORE’S "COMMON SENSE" AND THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

Wittgenstein on Other Minds

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Kailashkanta Naik ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Private Language Argument ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Other Minds Problem ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

When philosophy of mind goes into every detail in explaining about consciousness and its every aspect, the problem of other minds being its part is not spared. In such context going against the traditional way of giving justification Wittgenstein novel approach to other minds is remarkable and is close to the phenomenological understanding. The analysis of the sensation of pain as one of its important factors in solving the other minds problem is unique and it is this that proves how Wittgenstein dissolves the problem rather than giving a solution. This article focuses Wittgenstein’s two important factors: Private Language Argument and the concept of the sensation of pain in dissolving the issue. And in this I have made an attempt to show how his novelty in approaching this problem gains importance even today.

Dissolving the problem of other minds

2021 ◽  
pp. 120-128
Author(s):  
Diana I. Pérez ◽  
Antoni Gomila
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

Temptation and Therapy

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Sofia Miguens
Keyword(s):  
Common Factor ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Stanley Cavell ◽  
Different Shapes ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

AbstractAlthough many philosophers have, throughout history, regarded themselves as answering the skeptic, the question arises whether answering the skeptic is the thing to do. If not, the question becomes how else to respond to her. Wittgenstein-inspired stances are, in general, therapeutic. In this article I focus on the problem of other minds in order to analyze and compare the different shapes such therapeutic stances may have. I begin by showing how crucial resisting the temptation to answer the skeptic was for John McDowell’s early formulations of disjunctivism in the 1980s. In his article “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge” I identify substantial positions such as the rejection of highest common factor views, the diagnosis of the connection between such highest common factor views and an (untenable) conception of appearances, as well as the proposal of a non-Cartesian, or modest, approach to indistinguishability for a subject. Whatever his success in these other enterprises, McDowell continues to regard both the temptation to answer the skeptic and a substitute therapeutic stance as epistemologically motivated. But if skepticism is more than an intellectual conundrum, as maintained by Stanley Cavell, the source of such temptation has to be considered in a completely different light.

Hume on the Problem of Other Minds

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-555
Author(s):  
Byoungjae Kim
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

scholarly journals Chimeras and the Problem of Other Minds

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Capps
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

THREE PROBLEMS OF OTHER MINDS

Think ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (51) ◽  
pp. 63-75
Author(s):  
Chad Engelland
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Traditional Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds ◽  
Conceptual Problems ◽  
Everyday Experiences

The traditional problem of other minds is epistemological. What justification can be given for thinking that the world is populated with other minds? More recently, some philosophers have argued for a second problem of other minds that is conceptual. How can we conceive of the point of view of another mind in relation to our own? This article retraces the logic of the epistemological and conceptual problems, and it argues for a third problem of other minds. This is the phenomenological problem which concerns the philosophical (rather than psychological) question of experience. How is another mind experienced as another mind? The article offers dialectical and motivational justification for regarding these as three distinct problems. First, it argues that while the phenomenological problem cannot be reduced to the other problems, it is logically presupposed by them. Second, the article examines how the three problems are motivated by everyday experiences in three distinct ways.

On the Persistence of the ‘Problem of Other Minds’ in Psychology

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 601-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Leudar ◽  
Alan Costall
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document