Number of participations in employment subsidies per participant

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2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 216-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Beaudry ◽  
Charles Blackorby ◽  
Dezsö Szalay

This paper explores how to optimally set taxes and transfers when taxation authorities are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and nonmarket activities; and can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. We show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves a cutoff wage whereby workers above the cutoff are taxed as they increase their income, while workers earning a wage below the cutoff receive an income supplement as they increase their income. Finally, we show that the optimal program transfers zero income to individuals who choose not to work. (JEL D31, H21, H23, H24)


2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Fries ◽  
Christian Göbel ◽  
Michael F. Maier
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1999 ◽  
Vol 108 (5) ◽  
pp. 967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne L. Alstott
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Fries ◽  
Christian Goebel ◽  
Michael Florian Maier
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessio J.G. Brown ◽  
Christian Merkl ◽  
Dennis J. Snower
Keyword(s):  

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