scholarly journals Critical Social Ontology as a Foundation for Ethics: Marx, Lukács and Critical Judgment

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 8-26
Author(s):  
Michael J. Thompson

In this paper, I outline a theory of critical social ontology derived from the fundamental ideas of Marx and the later work on the ontology of social being by Georg Lukács. I argue that we can discern categories of social being that can aid in the project of diagnostic social critique, but also that these categories can be used to formulate an ethical theory that we can ground in this critical social ontology. I therefore defend the thesis, against postmetaphysical thinkers that have argued to the contrary, that a satisfactory and critical theory of ethics can and indeed must be rooted in a theory of ontology. I end with some reflections on how critical social ontology can help combat the problem of reification and help us think through issues of ethical or normative concern.

Thesis Eleven ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 157 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-96
Author(s):  
Michael Lazarus

This article examines the relationship between Marx’s Capital, Georg Lukács and Critical Theory through the prism of value-form theory. Marx’s theorisation of value understands commodities as expressions of the historical form of social relations defined by capital. Products of human labour become values in capitalist production, defined by the abstract quality of undifferentiated quantities of labour-power, exchangeable through the universal character of the market. The social form of this process, Marx identifies as processing a fetish quality, where humans take on the thing-like character of commodities. The impact of this theorisation on Critical Theory has been considerable, beginning with Lukács’ concept of reification. In Part I, I examine the challenge to Lukács’ interpretation of Marx’s Capital made by Gillian Rose. She draws attention to a misidentification of reification in Marx, suggesting a strong conceptual distinction between commodity-fetishism and reification. In their conceptual flattening, Rose contends that Lukács and Critical Theory generalised Marx’s value-form theory, losing its speculative character. I argue that despite Rose’s suggestion remaining unfulfilled, she helps illuminate important tensions between Marx’s value theory and Critical Theory. This comparison allows in Part II for the beginning level of a speculative approach to Marx’s Capital to be advanced.


Digithum ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Onni Hirvonen

This paper critically examines John Dewey’s and Axel Honneth’s critical social philosophies in order to highlight two different normative sources of social struggle: scientific understanding and social suffering. The paper discusses the relations of these sources with each other and aims to show to what extent the normative sources of Dewey’s and Honneth’s critical social theories are compatible. The comparison between Dewey and Honneth is used in order to argue for a desiderata for critical social ontology. The argument is that we want to consistently include both elements – suffering and understanding – in a critical theory as only by having both will critical theory grant a clear enough direction and good enough motivational normative core for a social struggle.


Author(s):  
Mikko Immanen

This chapter argues that Herbert Marcuse's Freiburg writings formed a continuous effort to redirect Martin Heidegger's philosophical revolution from solipsistic existentialism toward a critical theory of capitalism or concrete philosophy. It discusses how Marcuse did not see himself simply as criticizing Heidegger but rather persuading him to recognize the social-critical, Hegelian-Marxist elements of Being and Time. It also sheds new light on Lucien Goldmann's famous claim about Heidegger's debt to Georg Lukács by showing that Marcuse had suspected such debt in the 1920s. The chapter looks at Marcuse's experience as part of the failed socialist revolution in Germany after World War I that is crucial in understanding why he could become enthusiastic about Heidegger. It mentions Marcuse's goal to reconstruct the philosophical premises of Marxism.


1971 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Tertulian
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