Cost of Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Study of Bank Loan Contracts

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zengyuan Sun ◽  
Frank M. Song ◽  
Chen Lin
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Corporate Fraud ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts

What Determines the Design of Bank Loan Contracts? A New Channel

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tolga Caskurlu
Keyword(s):  
Bank Loan ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts

Proprietary information and the cost of bank debt

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
HyunJun Na
Keyword(s):  
Least Square ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Proprietary Information ◽  
Banking Deregulation ◽  
Interstate Banking ◽  
Innovative Firms ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis study explores how the firm’s proprietary information has an impact on the bank loan contracts. It explains the propensity of using the competitive bid option (CBO) in the syndicate loans to solicit the best bid for innovative firms and how it changes based on industry competition and the degree of innovations. This research also examines how the interstate banking deregulation (Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act) in 1994 affected the private loan contracts for innovative borrowers.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses various econometric analyses. First, it uses the propensity score matching analysis to see the impact of patents on pricing terms. Second, it uses the two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis by implementing the litigation and non-NYSE variables. Finally, it studies the impact of the policy change of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 on the bank loan contracts.FindingsFirms with more proprietary information pays more annual facility fees but less other fees. The patents are the primary determinants of the usage of CBO in the syndicate loans to solicit the best bid. While innovative firms can have better contract conditions by the CBO, firms with more proprietary information will less likely to use the CBO option to minimize the leakage of private information and the severe monitoring from the banks. Finally, more proprietary information lowered the loan spread for firms dependent on the external capital after the interstate banking deregulation.Originality/valueThe findings of this research will help senior executives with responsibility for financing their innovative projects. In addition, these findings should prove helpful for the lawmakers to boost economies.

Accounting conservatism, and bank loan contracts: Evidence from China

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 200-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gang Zhao ◽  
Shangkun Liang ◽  
Yutao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts

Private benefits of control and bank loan contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 324-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chih-Yung Lin ◽  
Wei-Che Tsai ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan ◽  
Le Quoc Tuan
Keyword(s):  
Bank Loan ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts

scholarly journals The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and Renegotiation

10.3386/w4273 ◽  
1993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Gorton ◽  
James Kahn
Keyword(s):  
Bank Loan ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts

Can lenders discern managerial ability from luck? Evidence from bank loan contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 187-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dien Giau Bui ◽  
Yan-Shing Chen ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan ◽  
Chih-Yung Lin
Keyword(s):  
Bank Loan ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts

Is unsystematic risk priced in bank loan contracts?

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (13) ◽  
pp. 1233-1237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margot Quijano
Keyword(s):  
Bank Loan ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts

Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Ying Chan ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan ◽  
Chih-Yung Lin
Keyword(s):  
Agency Cost ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts
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