The Demand for External Audit Quality: The Contribution of Agency Theory in the Context of Cameroon

This study examines the effect of agency theory on the demand for external audit quality in Cameroon. Specifically, it looks at the impact of shareholder/manager agency cost, shareholders/creditors agency cost, and majority/minority shareholders agency cost on external audit quality demand in Cameroon. The focus is on a sample of 171 companies drawn from the regions of Littoral, Centre and North-West using questionnaires. We assess the explanatory power of agency theory on the demand for a better quality of audit in the Cameroonian context by modelling external audit quality as a function of agency costs. The logistic regression analysis allows us to study the nature of any possible interaction. The analysis shows that while an increase in shareholder/creditor agency cost and an increase in shareholder/manager agency cost negatively affect the demand for audit quality, the majority/minority agency cost and the size of the audited client positively and significantly affect the demand for audit quality.

How does ownership structure affect the financing and dividend decisions of firm?

Purpose Ownership structure deals with internal corporate governance mechanism, which plays important role in minimizing conflict of interests between shareholders and management Ownership structure is an important mechanism that influences the value of firm, financing and dividend decisions. This paper aims to examine the impact of the ownership structures, i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership on financing and dividend policy. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data of manufacturing firms from both developed and developing countries, and the generalized method of moments (GMM) is applied to analyze the results. The authors collect the data from DataStream for the period of 2010 to 2019. Findings The authors find that managerial ownership and ownership concentration have significant and positive effects on debt financing, but they have significant and negative effects on dividend policy. Institutional ownership shows a positive impact on financing decisions and dividend policy for sample firms. Originality/value This study fills the gap by proving the policy implications for both firms and investors, as managers prefer debt financing, but at the same time try to ignore dividend payment. Therefore, investors may not invest in firms with a higher proportion of managerial ownership and may choose to invest more in institutional ownership, which lowers the agency cost.

The Effect of Formal Contracts, Transaction Cost, Agency Cost, Principal Agent Conflicts and Principal Agent Relationships on Village Funds Allocation in Facing the Covid 19 Crisis in Dolok Masihul District, Serdang Bedagai Regency

This study is related to the concept of public institution on principal agent relationship, namely the relationship between the Village Head and the Village Secretary in local government named Dolok Masihul. The number of villages studied were 44 respondents. Analysis statistical investigates relationship of research variable and using multiple regressions model. After analysing was known that formal contract had a significant positive effect on village funds allocation with value of 0.355. it means both head villager and secretaries had the competence and authority to carry it out, as Pascal (1997), Meinard (1997), Sarwoko (2010: 28) and Syofyan (2019). Hypothesis is accepted. Transaction costs have a negative effect and the hypothesis is rejected. Transaction costs refer to the governance structure as (Klein, 1999: 464-466), (Williamson, 1985). This result is different from the research by Syofyan (2019). Agency costs have coefficient value 0.072. It means agency cost significant to village funds. The hypothesis is accepted. Agency costs in this study are coaching and supervision that are positively related to the total allocation of village funds. This result is in line with Syofyan (2019).

Capital Structure and Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

Investigations into the relationship between capital structure and firm performance over the years have consistently produced mixed results in the light of prevailing theories relevant to the concept of capital structure. The study examined the nature of the relationship between the capital structure of Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria and the trend of performance recorded in the industry. Leverage was adopted as a surrogate for capital structure, while firm performance was proxied by profit efficiency and return on equity. A regression analysis test was applied to a balanced panel data, pooled from a sample of 11 DMBs to determine the impact of capital structure on performance. The study found evidence that supports a non-monotonic relationship between capital structure and performance of DMBs, as predicted by the agency cost theoretical model. A major recommendation elicited from the findings of the study advocates for legal control on the proportion of debt DMBs can include in their capital structure if they are to operate as efficiently as expected.

DO CEOS WITH SHARE PLEDGE SUPPRESS THE FIRMS’ INNOVATION?

It is a common phenomenon for corporate insiders to pledge their stock as collateral for personal loans in China. Using Chinese data, this paper examines the effects of CEOs’ share pledge on the firms’ future innovation output. Evidence suggests that the existence of CEOs with share pledge has a significantly negative effect on firms’ innovation output. The baseline results are consistent with a variety of robust tests. Furthermore, we propose the effect of CEOs’ share pledge works on the corporate innovation through the market value management channel. Finally, we find that the good corporate governance is a possible channel to relieve the agency cost on CEOs.

PENGARUH AGENCY COST TERHADAP NILAI PERUSAHAAN BUMN YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA

Agency problem timbul akibat adanya perbedaan kepentingan antara agen dan prinsipal. Kepemilikan saham pada perusahaan BUMN yang terkonsentrasi pada kepemilikan pemerintah sebagai prinsipal cenderung memungkinkan terjadinya agency problem yang lebih besar. Agency problem akan menimbulkan biaya yang harus ditanggung oleh perusahaan yang disebut agency cost. Pengukuran tingkat agency cost pada penelitian ini menggunakan expense ratio dan total turnover ratio. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat pengaruh agency cost terhadap nilai perusahaan BUMN yang diproksikan dengan rasio Tobin’s Q.

Behavior of Company Performance in Response to Dividend Policy: An Analysis of Textile Sector Listed in Pakistan Stock Exchange

The current study explains the relationship of dividend payout policy on the business performance of companies that exist in textile of Pakistan. 100 companies are selected from textile sector. Relationship of dividend payout policy and business performance was controlled with four variables based on relevant theories. These variables include size of company, growth of company, leverage (debt to equity ratio) and corporate governance index. Panel data is collected from 2012-2017 (six years) and then analyzed with unit root, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, OLS regression, Lagrange multiplier, Huasman test, Fixed effect and Random effect models. Following key findings for each research objective were obtained by applying the adopted research method on the data through the adopted method of analyses: The results of the study show that in textile companies, a negative relationship occurs between dividend payout policy and their profitability. Furthermore, size of the firm according to the pecking order theory and leverage as per the agency cost theory came out to have a significant controlling effect on this negative relationship.

Female Director and Agency Cost: Does board gender diversity at Indian corporate board reduce agency conflict?

We examined the presence of women directors in top-level management and their effect on principal-principal conflict (PP) and principal-agent conflict (PA) on the firms listed on Indian stock exchange using a panel model approach. For analysis purpose, this study covers the sample of 75 companies belonging to various industries and listed in Bombay Stock Exchange Index, has been studied over thirteen financial years, i.e. from year 2006 to year 2019. This study uses panel data analysis, i.e. fixed effect model and random effect model. The proportion and presence (dichotomous) of women directors on top level management board is taken as the independent variable. Principal-principal conflict measured by assets utilization ratio (AUR), and principal-agent conflict is been measured by dividend payout ratio (DPR), are taken as dependent variable in this study. The prime results of this study using panel data analysis, i.e. fixed effect (FE) and random effects (RE) estimation models point towards no significant impact of the female director (proportion and presence) on the firm’s agency cost (PP and PA).

Corporate Governance and Risk Disclosure in Emerging Countries

The study examines the influence of corporate governance attributes on the corporate risk disclosure in the emerging countries. Board size, non-executive directors, independent directors, board diversity and CEO-duality are the important board of director’s composition that is considered as corporate governance variables for this study. The study focuses on South Africa and Nigeria as these countries are among major players in the African emerging market. The sample comprises 42 financial and non-financial firms listed in Nigerian Stock Exchange and Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The data was drawn from 192 annual reports for the year 2014–2018. The analytical tools employed are manual content analysis and regression. The empirical results show that operational risk disclosure outweighs environmental and strategic risk disclosure. Meanwhile, past information, non-monetary and good news are considered less relevant, however dominatefuture, monetary and bad news which are more valuable to diverse stakeholders. Moreover, in considering the important factors that impact on the risk confession, that board size, independent director and diversity have greater influence in driving the risk disclosure upward. Nevertheless, non-executive director and CEO-Duality are statistically insignificant in determining the movement of risk information to divulge. The persistence of contemporary corporate risk practice jampacked with irrelevant information might promote greater agency cost. The implication for the current practice might increase investors’ uncertainty which in turn would raise the company cost of capital. This issue could be addressed by regulating risk disclosure in emerging countries instead of allowing corporate managers to report risk related information at their discretion. Corporate manager are also encourage to appreciate all the potential risk disclosure drivers in the African emerging countries.