Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Display Advertising

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-Ju Chen
Keyword(s):  
Display Advertising ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Display Advertising

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 897-913 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-Ju Chen
Keyword(s):  
Display Advertising ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Revenue Management

2002 ◽  
Vol 48 (11) ◽  
pp. 1388-1407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Vulcano ◽  
Garrett van Ryzin ◽  
Costis Maglaras
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Management ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

scholarly journals Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahab Mirrokni ◽  
Renato Paes Leme ◽  
Pingzhong Tang ◽  
Song Zuo
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 682-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mallesh M. Pai ◽  
Rakesh Vohra
Keyword(s):  
Simple Index ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

scholarly journals Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2125-2132
Author(s):  
Vahab Mirrokni ◽  
Renato Paes Leme ◽  
Pingzhong Tang ◽  
Song Zuo
Keyword(s):  
Value Functions ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Dynamic Programs ◽  
Dual Analysis ◽  
Primal Dual ◽  
Optimal Dynamic ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Monotone Constraints

We are interested in the setting where a seller sells sequentially arriving items, one per period, via a dynamic auction. At the beginning of each period, each buyer draws a private valuation for the item to be sold in that period and this valuation is independent across buyers and periods. The auction can be dynamic in the sense that the auction at period t can be conditional on the bids in that period and all previous periods, subject to certain appropriately defined incentive compatible and individually rational conditions. Perhaps not surprisingly, the revenue optimal dynamic auctions are computationally hard to find and existing literatures that aim to approximate the optimal auctions are all based on solving complex dynamic programs. It remains largely open on the structural interpretability of the optimal dynamic auctions. In this paper, we show that any optimal dynamic auction is a virtual welfare maximizer subject to some monotone allocation constraints. In particular, the explicit definition of the virtual value function above arises naturally from the primal-dual analysis by relaxing the monotone constraints. We further develop an ironing technique that gets rid of the monotone allocation constraints. Quite different from Myerson’s ironing approach, our technique is more technically involved due to the interdependence of the virtual value functions across buyers. We nevertheless show that ironing can be done approximately and efficiently, which in turn leads to a Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme of the optimal dynamic auction.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Revenue Management

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Vulcano ◽  
Garrett van Ryzin ◽  
Costis Maglaras
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Management ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

WHERE ARE THE 99%?: THE IMPACTS OF DISPLAY ADVERTISING ON CONSUMER RESPONSES BEYOND CLICK

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 182-183
Author(s):  
Jang Ho Moon ◽  
◽  
Kichang Han ◽  
Sanghyun Lim ◽  
Gyungjin Bae ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Responses ◽  
Display Advertising
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