Correcting for the Backfill Bias in Hedge Fund Databases, Appendix To: Do Hot Hands Exist Among Hedge Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ravi Jagannathan ◽  
Alexey Malakhov ◽  
Dmitry Novikov
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Empirical Evaluation ◽  
Fund Managers

Do Hot Hands Exist among Hedge Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation

2010 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAVI JAGANNATHAN ◽  
ALEXEY MALAKHOV ◽  
DMITRY NOVIKOV
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Empirical Evaluation ◽  
Fund Managers

scholarly journals Do Hot Hands Exist Among Hedge Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ravi Jagannathan ◽  
Alexey Malakhov ◽  
Dmitry Novikov
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Empirical Evaluation ◽  
Fund Managers

Do Hedge Fund Managers Display Skill?

CFA Digest ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-13
Author(s):  
Keith H. Black
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Managers

Why Do Hedge Fund Managers Outperform?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Istvan Nagy ◽  
Ivan Guidotti
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Managers

Duration of poor performance and risk shifting by hedge fund managers

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 35-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Li ◽  
A. Steven Holland ◽  
Hossein B. Kazemi
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Risk Shifting ◽  
Fund Managers

Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and Fees

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Value ◽  
Net Asset Value ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Financial Misstatement

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.

Portraits of five hedge fund fraud cases

2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb ◽  
Chun Chun “Sylvia” Yang
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Investment Fund ◽  
Good Opportunity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Management Group ◽  
Fund Industry ◽  
Asset Managers

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is two fold: educate investors about hedge fund managers' activities prior to the fraud recognition by the authorities and to help investors and other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry identify red flags before fraud is actually committed.Design/methodology/approachThe paper investigates fraud committed by the Bayou Funds, Beacon Hill Asset Management, Lancer Management Group (LMG), Lipper & Company and Maricopa investment fund. The fraud activities took place during 2000 and 2005.FindingsThe five cases alone cost the hedge fund investors more than $1.5 billion. Investors may have had a good opportunity for avoiding the irrecoverable costs of the fraud had they carefully vetted the backgrounds of the hedge fund managers and/or continuously monitored the funds activities, especially during turbulent market environments.Originality/valueThis is the first research paper to identify and extensively investigate fraud committed by hedge funds. In spite of the size of the hedge fund industry and relatively substantial level and inevitably recurring fraud, academic journals are to yet address this issue. The paper is of great value to hedge funds and their individual and institutional investors, asset managers, financial advisers and regulators.

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