We examine whether proprietary costs drive R&D-active firms’ choice of private loan structure. We find that R&D-active firms are more likely to choose single-lender over multi-lender private loan financing. This is consistent with the theory that high-ability entrepreneurs protect their proprietary knowledge by communicating it to a single lender while disclosing generic and less sensitive information to the public. This propensity, however, significantly decreases after the enactment of the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA), which accelerated public disclosure of firms’ patent details in filings with the US Patent and Trademark Office. This accelerated public disclosure potentially caused R&D information to spill over to rivals, increasing the proprietary costs of single-lender borrowers. AIPA enactment also increased the spread on R&D-active firms’ single-lender loans. These findings contribute to the voluntary disclosure and financing-choice literature by linking R&D-active firms’ choice of single-lender financing to the proprietary costs of public disclosure.
We investigate the consequences for non-promoted executives (NPEs) in CEO tournaments. We find that NPEs’ total incentives decrease following the end of a tournament based on evidence of their reduced future promotion prospects and limited adjustments to their compensation. Consistent with the theory that NPEs leave in response to this loss in incentives, results indicate that turnover is higher for NPEs who: 1) are ex ante more competitive for promotion, 2) compete in open tournaments without an heir apparent versus closed tournaments with an heir apparent winner, and 3) compete in tournaments with an outsider versus insider winner. Departed NPEs’ subsequent career outcomes suggest that the labor market assesses NPEs who leave after open tournaments more favorably than those who leave after closed tournaments and tournaments with an outsider winner. Overall, evidence suggests that promotion tournaments can weed out low-quality managers but also cause the unintended turnover of high-quality managers.
Banks play a central role in creating liquidity for the economy by financing illiquid assets with liquid liabilities. This paper examines the effect of accounting restatements on bank liquidity creation. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I show that restatements trigger a significant reduction in liquidity creation. This effect derives mainly from banks shifting away from illiquid assets and toward liquid assets. Further analysis reveals that restatements affect liquidity creation through supervisory enforcement actions and unravelling of risk exposures accumulated in the misreporting period. Government deposit insurance blunts the effect of an information asymmetry channel.
We provide initial evidence that stock exchange procedures around closing auctions advantage speed traders at the expense of auction participants. We show that, on Nasdaq and NYSE Arca, 4:00 pm earnings releases result in informed trading in the continuous regular-hour session in the short window between 4:00 pm and the closing auction; this trading subsequently moves closing prices in the direction of the earnings news. The ability of speed traders to submit 4:00 pm-news orders to the auction through the continuous session earns them up to 1.5% profit and creates an unlevel playing field because most auction participants are not allowed to cancel their orders. When stock exchanges recommended that firms delay disclosures until after the market close, those with higher institutional ownership were more likely to do so voluntarily. Our study has implications regarding the timing of information releases and the design of the closing process.
We provide the first comprehensive analysis of the properties of investment recommendations generated by “Robo-Analysts,” which are human-analyst-assisted computer programs conducting automated research analysis. Our results indicate that Robo-Analyst recommendations differ from those produced by traditional “human” research analysts across several important dimensions. First, Robo-Analysts produce a more balanced distribution of buy, hold, and sell recommendations than do human analysts and are less likely to recommend “glamour” stocks and firms with prospective investment banking business. Second, automation allows Robo-Analysts to revise their recommendations more frequently than human analysts and incorporate information from complex periodic filings. Third, while Robo-Analysts’ recommendations exhibit weak short-window return reactions, they have long-term investment value. Specifically, portfolios formed based on the buy recommendations of Robo-Analysts significantly outperform those of human analysts. Overall, our results suggest that automation in the sell-side research industry can benefit investors.
This study examines how activity-based costing (ABC) cost driver framing affects suppliers’ ability to increase their bargaining power when facing powerful customers. Results of an experiment show that suppliers with high potential to contribute to increasing joint profits are able to increase their power and earn a higher share of joint profits than suppliers with low contribution potential. However, providing suppliers with externally framed cost drivers (cost drivers represented as customers’ activities) instead of internally framed cost drivers (cost drivers represented as suppliers’ own activities) reduces their ability to utilize contribution potential as a source of power. Analyses of negotiators’ behavior show that suppliers with high contribution potential and internally framed cost drivers use more integrative tactics to increase joint profits, allowing them to earn higher shares of joint profits. This study shows that the how firms frame cost drivers affects negotiators’ ability to improve joint profits and negotiation power.
Socializing personnel into accepting work hour norms has been fundamental to how accounting firms function, but is now challenged by contemporary work perspectives. Using 40 semi-structured interviews of personnel across hierarchical levels at a national firm and an international firm, we show how strangeness and contradiction expressed in work hour perspectives across different levels within both firms are reconstructed as compatible and complementary. Highlighting various firm adaptations, including alternative work arrangements, offshoring, and technological tools, our interviews suggest a major shift in firms’ approach toward work hours. This shift is fueled by work perspectives embraced by younger generations desiring work life balance and purposeful work, and enabled by technology supporting remote work and increasing work efficiencies. The question remains whether firms are evolving to genuinely embody work perspectives of younger generations or restructuring to rely on a smaller workforce willing to accept traditional work hour norms, or some combination thereof.