The Pricing of IPO Audit Specialization and Subsequent Issuer Underpricing

We study the costs and benefits to the issuer of engaging an initial public offering (IPO) auditor specialist. We measure IPO auditor specialization and then find that IPO specialist auditors earn significant fee premiums relative to IPO auditors without specialization and that clients with an IPO specialist auditor exhibit lower levels of underpricing relative to clients without an IPO specialist auditor. We also demonstrate that IPO specialist auditors provide higher quality audits than IPO auditors without IPO audit specialization, finding that their IPO clients have a lower likelihood of financial misstatement and have lower discretionary accruals. Collectively, our results have important implications for the auditing profession and capital markets because we demonstrate empirical evidence of the costs and benefits of engaging IPO specialist auditors.

Analyzing earnings management preferences from business strategies

Purpose This study aims to examine the preference for earnings management (EM) strategies according to business strategies, namely, cost leadership strategies and differentiation strategies, Design/methodology/approach This study analyzed 262 samples of manufacturing and service companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2019. Logistic regression analysis is used to test the company’s EM strategy preferences based on the applied business strategy. Findings The results prove that business strategy has a significant effect on EM strategy preferences. Companies that implement a cost leadership strategy tend to use an accrual form of EM rather than a real form of EM. Conversely, companies that implement a differentiation strategy tend to use a real form of EM. Research limitations/implications Theoretically, this study confirms that contingency theory can explain EM practice preferences based on business strategy. Practically, this study helps auditors and financial statement analysts in assessing the quality of financial statements, as well as the risk of financial misstatement based on the business strategy adopted by the companies. Originality/value Based on prior literature, research studies on the analysis of EM strategy preferences based on business strategy have been limited.

CEO Behavioral Integrity, Auditor Responses, and Firm Outcomes

ABSTRACT We investigate the audit fee response to CEO behavioral integrity (BI). BI refers to the perceived congruence between an individual's words and deeds (Simons 2002). Because low word-deed congruence should result in more explanations when communicating, we use variation in explanations beyond firm fundamentals and CEO-specific characteristics in more than 30,000 shareholder letters to serve as a linguistic-based proxy for CEO BI. We find that audit fees increase as BI decreases, but BI is not associated with financial misstatement or litigation. These findings are potentially consistent with auditors undertaking additional work in response to low BI, which, in turn, mitigates the risk of restatements and lawsuits. The likelihood of option backdating increases as BI decreases, consistent with the contention that auditors lacked incentives to prevent backdating. Finally, BI is increasing in future performance, which suggests that CEOs partially underpin the returns to high-integrity corporate cultures. JEL Classifications: J24; L25; M14; M41; M42. Data Availability: Proprietary data from KRW International cannot be shared because of the terms of a confidentiality agreement. All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.