Implications of Mediated Market Access—Exploring the Nature of Vertical Relationships within the Croatian Wine Industry

The aim of this research was to provide a better understanding of factors influencing the performance of (small) agricultural producers. Considering the importance of agricultural producers, not just for maintaining a steady supply of products but also for the preservation of the population (and cultural tradition) of rural areas, the development of sustainable agricultural business is a matter of public interest. This paper considers wine producers and their market channels, i.e., the factors influencing the relationship between wine producers and market intermediaries, by applying ideas taken from agency theory. We developed a conceptual model with our defined measure of agency costs as the mediator variable between multiple regressors and the firms’ financial and non-financial performance as regressions. We used the approach of Baron and Kenny to investigate whether agency costs act as a mediator variable. The data needed to test the proposed conceptual model were collected through questionnaires and contextual interviews with the Croatian wine producers (n = 124). We found that more self-reliance in the distribution process, supported by factors related to the bargaining strength, had a positive influence on wine producers’ performance. The results also support the assumption that agency costs act as a full mediator variable between a producer’s attributes and its performance.

Minority investor protection mechanisms and agency costs: An empirical study using a World Bank–developed approach

This study aims to examine the impact of minority investor protection mechanisms on agency costs. All relevant indicators of minority investor protection adapted from the World Bank’s annual ‘Doing Business’ reports, along with concentrated government ownership, are employed with a panel data sample of 135 Vietnamese listed firms during the period 2014–2018. It is found that the following mechanisms are effective in mitigating agency costs and hence agency problems at the firm level: 1) review and approval requirements for related-party transactions; 2) minority shareholders’ ability to sue and hold directors liable for their duties; 3) minority shareholders’ access to internal corporate documents; 4) investors’ rights to approve major corporate investment and sale of asset decisions; and 5) disclosure in annual reports of salaries, bonuses and other forms of remuneration to directors and management. Interestingly, board independence and controlling government shareholders are not confirmed to play significant roles in addressing agency problems. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt at testing for the impact of minority investor protection mechanisms developed by the World Bank on agency costs at the firm level, hence providing empirical evidence for the adoption of the minority investor protection mechanisms promoted by the World Bank. This study also provides policy implications for selecting effective mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors in order to enhance the financial performance of firms in an Asian emerging market.

The Effect of Formal Contracts, Transaction Cost, Agency Cost, Principal Agent Conflicts and Principal Agent Relationships on Village Funds Allocation in Facing the Covid 19 Crisis in Dolok Masihul District, Serdang Bedagai Regency

This study is related to the concept of public institution on principal agent relationship, namely the relationship between the Village Head and the Village Secretary in local government named Dolok Masihul. The number of villages studied were 44 respondents. Analysis statistical investigates relationship of research variable and using multiple regressions model. After analysing was known that formal contract had a significant positive effect on village funds allocation with value of 0.355. it means both head villager and secretaries had the competence and authority to carry it out, as Pascal (1997), Meinard (1997), Sarwoko (2010: 28) and Syofyan (2019). Hypothesis is accepted. Transaction costs have a negative effect and the hypothesis is rejected. Transaction costs refer to the governance structure as (Klein, 1999: 464-466), (Williamson, 1985). This result is different from the research by Syofyan (2019). Agency costs have coefficient value 0.072. It means agency cost significant to village funds. The hypothesis is accepted. Agency costs in this study are coaching and supervision that are positively related to the total allocation of village funds. This result is in line with Syofyan (2019).

They do not look alike: what kind of private investors do equity crowdfunded firms attract?

Using a dataset of 170 firms that successfully fundraised via the two most prominent UK equity crowdfunding platforms, we investigate whether and how having successfully run an equity crowdfunding campaign is associated to the reputation of follow-on venture capital investors attracted. From the comparison with a control group of firms that received a seed round from business angels, we found that firms that have run a successful equity crowdfunding campaign attract lower reputable VCs. These results are confirmed when controlling for endogeneity and for firms’ characteristics. Considering the shareholder structure chosen by the firm raising equity crowdfunding, we found that firms opting for a direct shareholder structure, which entails higher coordination and agency costs, attract less reputable VCs compared to firms opting for the nominee shareholder structure.