Internal Capital Markets in Family Business Groups During the Global Financial Crisis

Author(s):  
Alvin Ang ◽  
Ronald W. Masulis ◽  
Peter K. Pham ◽  
Jason Zein
2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 903-918
Author(s):  
Minwoo Lee ◽  
Yuwon Choi ◽  
Sanghyuk Moon

This study examines whether the effect of funding through internal capital markets on investment efficiency is differentiated by the incentives of controlling shareholders as measured by the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling shareholders (hereafter, wedge). To empirically analyze hypotheses of this study, 1,189 firm-year observations were collected from Korean firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) belonging to a large business group designated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission over the period from 2005 to 2012. The results of the analysis are as follows. First, we find that the magnitude of internal funding, as measured by total payables to the related parties, is positively (+) associated with investment inefficiency. Second, the interaction variables of total payables to the related parties and the wedge have a significant positive (+) effect on investment inefficiency. In other words, the deterioration of investment efficiency due to the increase in total payables to the related parties was mainly caused by firms with a big wedge. This result suggests that the effect of internal capital markets on investment efficiency of large business groups may be differentiated by the wedge that is proxy of the controlling shareholder’s incentive. This study provides additional evidence on previous studies on the investment efficiency of large business groups by considering both the internal capital market and incentives for funding using the internal capital market, which are important factors affecting the investment of large corporate groups. Also, the results of this study are expected to provide implications for the regulatory policy of large business groups which have recently become an issue in Korea.


Author(s):  
Jordan Cally

This chapter studies the roles of intermediaries. As exchanges developed in Western Europe and the colonies, they spun out a widening web of intermediaries participating in the process of trading financial products. In the lead up to the global financial crisis, the roles assumed by intermediaries, and their sources of revenue, had mutated over time. Intermediaries became issuers and capital raisers in their own right. Originally handmaidens to the exchanges, intermediaries created a new, free floating, trading world. In this new trading world, the potential conflicts of interest inherent in agency relationships have been exacerbated by the multiple roles intermediaries have assumed. Further intensifying the stresses on market relationships have been the rapid changes in trading practices now permitted by technology and the internationalization of the capital markets. Lastly, over ten years after the global financial crisis, regulatory responses continue to play out, as markets and intermediaries jockey and adjust to the new rules.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-54
Author(s):  
Mariya Paskaleva ◽  
Ani Stoykova

Financial globalization has opened international capital markets to investors and companies worldwide. However, the global financial crisis also caused massive stock price volatility due in part to global availability of market information. We explore ten EU member states (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain), and the USA. The explored period is March 3, 2003 to June 30, 2016, and includes the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008. The purpose of the article is to determine whether there is a contagion effect between the Bulgarian stock market and the other examined stock markets during the crisis period and whether these markets are efficient. We apply an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, DCC-GARCH model, autoregressive (AR) models, TGARCH model, and descriptive statistics. Our results show that a contagion between the Bulgarian capital market and the eight capital markets examined did exist during the global financial crisis of 2008. We register the strongest contagion effects from the U.S. and German capital markets on the Bulgarian capital market. The Bulgarian capital market is relatively integrated with the stock markets of Germany and the United State, which serves as an explanation of why the Bulgarian capital market was exposed to financial contagion effects from the U.S. capital market and the capital markets of EU member states during the crisis. We register statistically significant AR (1) for UK, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria, and we can define these global capital markets as inefficient.


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