Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. McLean ◽  
Ichiro Obara ◽  
Andrew Postlewaite
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring

scholarly journals Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

2014 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 191-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard McLean ◽  
Ichiro Obara ◽  
Andrew Postlewaite
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring

Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

2002 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michihiro Kandori
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring

A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games

2009 ◽  
Vol 144 (2) ◽  
pp. 802-824 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichi Yamamoto
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takuo Sugaya ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Private Monitoring

Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

2010 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 322-326
Author(s):  
Rui Li
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

2013 ◽  
Vol 148 (5) ◽  
pp. 1891-1928 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takuo Sugaya ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Private Monitoring

Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring

Econometrica ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Compte
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring

scholarly journals The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaki Aoyagi ◽  
V. Bhaskar ◽  
Guillaume R. Fréchette
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Monitoring ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ across the three treatments. Specifically, the strategies under imperfect monitoring are both more complex and more lenient than those under perfect monitoring. The results show how the changes in strategies across monitoring structures mitigate the effect of noise in monitoring on efficiency. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D82, D83)

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