scholarly journals The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaki Aoyagi ◽  
V. Bhaskar ◽  
Guillaume R. Fréchette
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Monitoring ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ across the three treatments. Specifically, the strategies under imperfect monitoring are both more complex and more lenient than those under perfect monitoring. The results show how the changes in strategies across monitoring structures mitigate the effect of noise in monitoring on efficiency. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D82, D83)

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
George J. Mailath ◽  
Steven A. Matthews ◽  
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Public Signals ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Public Signal ◽  
Action Profile

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daehyun Kim ◽  
Xiaoxi Li
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Constructive Proof ◽  
The Public ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
Time Inconsistent ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

This paper defines a general framework to study infinitely repeated games with time-dependent discounting in which we distinguish and discuss both time-consistent and -inconsistent preferences. To study the long-term properties of repeated games, we introduce an asymptotic condition to characterize the fact that players become more and more patient; that is, the discount factors at all stages uniformly converge to one. Two types of folk theorems are proven without the public randomization assumption: the asymptotic one, that is, the equilibrium payoff set converges to the feasible and individual rational set as players become patient, and the uniform one, that is, any payoff in the feasible and individual rational set is sustained by a single strategy profile that is an approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in all games with sufficiently patient discount factors. We use two methods for the study of asymptotic folk theorem: the self-generating approach and the constructive proof. We present the constructive proof in the perfect-monitoring case and show that it can be extended to time-inconsistent preferences. The self-generating approach applies to the public-monitoring case but may not extend to time-inconsistent preferences because of a nonmonotonicity result.

scholarly journals On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Dal Bó ◽  
Guillaume R. Fréchette
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Personal Characteristics ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Experimental Literature ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games

A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it. (JEL C71, C73, D81, D83)

The Impact of Antitrust Fines on the Formation of Collusive Cartels

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Bartolini ◽  
Alberto Zazzaro
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Coalitional Game ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Enforcement Costs ◽  
Cartel Formation ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games

Abstract The literature on collusive cartels has mainly focused on the impact of antitrust fines on the sustainability of cartels, in infinitely repeated games. This approach, however, does not allow us to study the effect of antitrust fines on the incentives to form cartels in the first place. In this paper, we adopt a coalitional game approach to modeling collusive agreements, showing that antitrust fines may drive firms from partial cartels to a monopolistic cartel. Moreover, by introducing uncertainty on market demand, we show that the socially optimal competition policy can call for a finite or even zero antitrust penalty, even if there are no enforcement costs. We provide a sufficient condition for these results to apply to any coalitional game of cartel formation with symmetric firms. Then, we discuss the extension to asymmetric firms and dynamic collusion.

scholarly journals Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chihiro Morooka
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Feasible Set ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

AbstractThis paper studies payoffs in subgame perfect equilibria of two-player discounted overlapping generations games with perfect monitoring. Assuming that mixed strategies are observable and a public randomization device is available, it is shown that sufficiently patient players can obtain any payoffs in the interior of the smallest rectangle containing the feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs of the stage game, when we first choose the rate of discount and then choose the players’ lifespan. Unlike repeated games without overlapping generations, obtaining payoffs outside the feasible set of the stage game does not require unequal discounting.

scholarly journals Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (7) ◽  
pp. 3317-3332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Ambrus ◽  
Ben Greiner
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Social ◽  
Severe Punishment ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing. (JEL C92, H41, K42)

Investigation of Cost-Influencing Factors Potentially ‎Controllable by Main Contractors in Construction Projects in ‎Iraq

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (7A) ◽  
pp. 1069-1076
Author(s):  
Layth T. Ali ◽  
Raid S. Abid Ali ◽  
Zeyad S. M. Khaled
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Cost Overrun ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Importance Index ◽  
Labor Recruitment ◽  
Supply Planning ◽  
Major Factors ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact

Cost overrun in construction projects is a common phenomenon in Iraq. This might occur due to diversity of factors. This study aims to identify the factors influencing construction projects cost that are potentially controllable by main contractors. A field study through a questionnaire survey was directed to a sample of related Iraqi professional engineers from general contracting companies at both public and private sectors. Their opinions on the impact and frequency of each factor were investigated. The questionnaire offered (59) factors classified in (8) categories namely; legislations, financial and economic, design, contractual, site management, material, labor and equipment. The factors were ranked according to the highest Relative Importance Index (RII). The study revealed (10) major factors that are potentially controllable by main contractors namely; labor productivity, sub-contractors and suppliers performance, equipment productivity, site organization and distribution of equipment, experience and training of project managers, scheduling and control techniques, planning for materials supply, planning for equipment supply, materials delivery and planning for skilled labor recruitment. Recommendations to aid contractors and owners in early identification of these factors are also included in this study.

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. McLean ◽  
Ichiro Obara ◽  
Andrew Postlewaite
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring
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