Liquidity risk and regulation in the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) banking industry

The recurring crises have evidenced poor liquidity risk management and ineffective regulation in banking. Consequently, banking regulations have undergone continuous reforms to bolster stability in the banking system. Nonetheless, theoretical and empirical evidence provide conflicting results that warrant comprehensive research, particularly for emerging Islamic banking. This study examines the role of banking regulation on the liquidity risk of 245 conventional banks and 68 Islamic banks from selected 14 Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) from 2000 to 2017 utilising the dynamic panel GMM (generalized method of moments) technique. We measure liquidity risk using the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and the total financing-to-total deposits and short-term funding (LDEP). Meanwhile, the regulatory measures are asset restriction (AR), private monitoring (PM), supervisory power (SP) and capital requirements (CR). The findings suggest that regulation has a limited impact on bank liquidity risk. The CR supports the value creation of regulation through the reduction in banks’ liquidity risks, while PM and SP are agency costs of regulation that lead to higher liquidity risks. The impact of CR is lower on liquidity risk in Islamic banking than conventional ones, probably due to limited Islamic liquidity risk management facilities. Thus, regulators should strengthen Islamic liquidity risk instruments and markets to facilitate Islamic banking growth.

Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information. I consider a continuous time repeated prisoner’s dilemma game where informative signals about another player’s past actions arrive following a Poisson process; actions have to be held fixed for a certain time. I assume that signals are privately observed by players. I consider an environment where signals are noisy, and the correlation of signals is higher if both players cooperate. We show that, provided that players can change their actions arbitrary frequently, there exists an equilibrium with communication that strictly Pareto-dominates all equilibria without communication.

Land Use and Facilities and the Spatial Distribution of Urban Property Crime

The main research problem of this article is to check whether and how selected land use and facilities influence the spatial distribution of different kinds of urban thefts (and burglary) in Krakow. The analysis uses data on all crimes committed in Krakow in the years 2016–2018. Its results are generally consistent with the results of other similar studies in so far as they indicate a relationship between the increased criminal activity of perpetrators and the availability of potential victims or objects of attack. Both the higher density of crimes in general and theft in general occurred above all in facilities or in the immediate vicinity of facilities which accumulate large communities for various purposes (activity nodes) or in places which produce the high intensity of people flows (communication nodes). One land use and facilities coexist with an increased density of all types of thefts, while others coexist only with some of them. The results, however, seem inconsistent with the rational choice theory assumptions as high crime density rates were observed in the immediate vicinity of public and private monitoring cameras, as well as within 50 meters of police stations.

Approach to Anomaly Detection in Self-Organized Decentralized Wireless Sensor Network for Air Pollution Monitoring

The paper reveals the essence and features of the proposed approach to detecting anomalies in a self-organizing decentralized wireless sensor network (WSN). As a basis for detecting anomalies, the used WSN is intended to monitor atmospheric air pollution near industrial facilities and human life objects. The distinctive features of such a network are the decentralized nature of its structure and services, the autonomy and mobility of the network nodes, as well as the possibility of non-deterministic physical movement of nodes in space. The spontaneous nature of the dynamic formation of the network topology as well as the assignment of roles and private monitoring functions between the available network nodes determines such networks are subject to attacks that exploit the properties of network decentralization and its self-organization. The proposed approach to detecting anomalies is based on the collection and analysis of data from sensors and is designed to increase the security of self-organizing decentralized WSN by identifying anomalies that are critical in the context of the monitoring purposes.

Monitoring systems for resistance to plant protection products across the world: Between redundancy and complementarity

BACKGROUNDMonitoring resistance to Plant Protection Products (PPPs) is crucial for understanding the evolution of resistances in bioagressors, thereby allowing scientists to design sound bioagressor management strategies. Globally, resistance monitoring is implemented by a wide range of actors that fall into three distinct categories: academic, governmental, and private. The purpose of this study was to investigate worldwide diversity in PPP resistance monitoring systems, and to shed light on their different facets.RESULTSA large survey involving 162 experts from 48 countries made it possible to identify and analyze 250 resistance monitoring systems. Through an in-depth analysis, the features of the different monitoring systems were identified. The main factor differentiating monitoring systems was essentially the capabilities (funding, manpower, technology, etc.) of the actors involved in each system. In most countries, and especially in those with a high Human Development Index, academic, governmental, and private monitoring systems coexist. Overall, systems focus far more on monitoring established resistances than on the detection of emerging resistances. Governmental and private resistance monitoring systems generally have considerable capacities to generate data, whereas academic resistance monitoring systems are more specialized. Governmental actors federate and enroll a wider variety of stakeholders.CONCLUSIONThe results show functional complementarities between the coexisting actors in countries where they coexist. We suggest PPP resistance monitoring might be enhanced if the different actors focus more on detecting emerging resistances (and associated benefits) and increase collaborative and collective efforts and transparency.

Public Provocation to Commit a Terrorist Offence: Balancing between the Liberties and the Security

Modern terrorism is global and decentralized like cyberspace. While the Darknet is mostly used by terrorists for fundraising campaigns and illicit trading, publicly accessible social platforms such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube are abused for terrorist propaganda. Combating terrorism remains one of the top priorities of the European union (hereinafter as “the EU”). The approach towards the online content possibly connected to terrorist propaganda has become stricter.This paper focuses on the development of the EU legislation on the offence related to terrorist activities: the public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, as well as on the obligations of hosting service providers. It also analyses the impact of the Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. The article observes a changing attitude on private monitoring of online information in the development of the EU legislation. It analyses changes in the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online. These changes signify a shift in the perception of the necessary level of freedom to receive and impart information through the internet.

Repeated Multimarket Contact with Private Monitoring: A Belief-Free Approach

This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring or observation errors). There has been no game-theoretic support that multimarket contact facilitates collusion or not, in the sense that more collusive equilibria in terms of per-market profits exist than those under a benchmark case of one market. An equilibrium candidate under the benchmark case is belief-free strategies. We are the first to construct a non-trivial class of strategies that exhibits the effect of multimarket contact from the perspectives of simplicity and mild punishment. Strategies must be simple because firms in a cartel must coordinate each other with no communication. Punishment must be mild to an extent that it does not hurt even the minimum required profits in the cartel. We thus focus on two-state automaton strategies such that the players are cooperative in at least one market even when he or she punishes a traitor. Furthermore, we identify an additional condition (partial indifference), under which the collusive equilibrium yields the optimal payoff.