Using proprietary survey data of investor relations (IR) officers from 59 countries, we uncover new stylized facts on a wide variety of IR functions, such as the firm’s interactions with brokers and investors, the formulation of its disclosure policies, and its global outreach efforts. We find that IR activities vary widely across firms, industries, and countries. They have become increasingly important, as reflected by the more frequent involvement of IR officers with senior executives on a day-to-day basis. We also find that large and complex firms receiving greater media attention engage more in IR activities. In addition, firms domiciled in countries with weaker legal protections for investors and poorer disclosure standards, those cross-listed in the stock markets that are outperforming, and those with high global media visibility invest in greater global outreach efforts with IR activities. Firms’ IR efforts to investors worldwide are associated with higher Tobin’s q valuation ratios. We interpret our findings in the context of theories and existing evidence on the role of asymmetric information and governance problems in global markets. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.
Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size
