Institutional Design as a Commitment Device in Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information: Experimental Evidence

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Di Cagno ◽  
Emanuela Sciubba
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Commitment Device

Asymmetric Information in Microinsurance Markets: Experimental Evidence from Mexico

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bauchet ◽  
Amy Damon ◽  
Brian Hunter
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Experimental Evidence

scholarly journals Rural Credit Markets and Aggregate Shocks: The Experience of Nuits St. Georges, 1756–1776

1994 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Rural Area ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
Aggregate Shocks ◽  
Rural Credit ◽  
Complete Enumeration ◽  
Rural Credit Markets ◽  
Credit Contracts

Using a complete enumeration of credit contracts for a rural area in Burgundy, this article examines how credit markets functioned and what role they served. Credit markets distributed funds to a large fraction of the population, and they were organized to mediate problems of asymmetric information. A central constraint on credit markets, however, was the threat of government intervention. Because of this threat, capital markets remained relatively isolated from one another.

Asymmetric Information and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 428-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrike Neyer
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Transmission Mechanism ◽  
Monetary Transmission ◽  
Credit Channel ◽  
Absolute Value ◽  
Monetary Transmission Mechanism ◽  
External Finance

Abstract This paper analyses the consequences of asymmetric information in credit markets for the monetary transmission mechanism. It shows that asymmetric information can not only reinforce but can also weaken or overcompensate the effects of the standard interest rate channel. Crucial is that informational problems lead to an external finance premium that can be positive or negative for marginal entrepreneurs. Tight money may lead to an increase in the absolute value of this premium, implying that there is a credit channel of monetary policy, but its working direction is ambiguous.

Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information: Differentiation in Credit Markets

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 375 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Miguel Villas-Boas ◽  
Udo Schmidt-Mohr
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Credit Markets
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