Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gadi Fibich ◽  
Arieh Gavious ◽  
Nir Gavish
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
Revenue Equivalence

Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

2010 ◽  
Vol 206 (2) ◽  
pp. 496-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gadi Fibich ◽  
Arieh Gavious
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
Revenue Equivalence ◽  
Interdependent Values

Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gadi Fibich ◽  
Arieh Gavious ◽  
Nir Gavish
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
Revenue Equivalence

Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions

2018 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 1489-1510
Author(s):  
Gadi Fibich ◽  
Arieh Gavious ◽  
Nir Gavish
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
Revenue Equivalence

scholarly journals Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

2004 ◽  
Vol 115 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gadi Fibich ◽  
Arieh Gavious ◽  
Aner Sela
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
Revenue Equivalence

Asymmetric Auctions with Endogenous Participation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Marquez ◽  
Rajdeep Singh
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
Endogenous Participation

Ranking Sealed High-Bid and Open Asymmetric Auctions

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harrison Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auctions

scholarly journals First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model

2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Philipp Reiß ◽  
Jens Robert Schöndube
Keyword(s):  
Price Equilibrium ◽  
Revenue Equivalence ◽  
Procurement Auction ◽  
Auction Model

scholarly journals A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem

2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Beltrán ◽  
Natalia Santamaría
Keyword(s):  
Equivalence Theorem ◽  
Auction Theory ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Revenue Equivalence ◽  
Extensive Simulation ◽  
Value Set ◽  
Equilibrium Bidding ◽  
The One

One not-so-intuitive result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem, which states that as long as an auction complies with some conditions, it will on average generate the same revenue to an auctioneer as the revenue generated by any other auction that complies with them. Surprisingly, the conditions are not defined on the payment rules to the bidders but on the fact that the bidders do not bid below a reserve value—set by the auctioneer—the winner is the one with the highest bidding and there is a common equilibrium bidding function used by all bidders. In this paper, we verify such result using extensive simulation of a broad range of auctions and focus on the variability or fluctuations of the results around the average. Such fluctuations are observed and measured in two dimensions for each type of auction: as the number of auctions grows and as the number of bidders increases.

On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions

2002 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Pezanis-Christou
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Results ◽  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
The Impact

Partial identification in asymmetric auctions in the absence of independence

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. S60-S92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana Komarova
Keyword(s):  
Partial Identification ◽  
Asymmetric Auctions
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